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ZIONISM, RACISM AND THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE - I

ZIONISM, RACISM, AND THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE:
FIFTY YEARS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN
ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
ARDI lMSEISt

The magnitude of Israeli human rights violations against the
Palestinian people has been well documented by independent scholars,
and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations such as
the United Nations, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch.
However, relatively little has been written regarding the role the official
Israeli state ideology has played in encouraging and upholding the
Jewish state's policies regarding the indigenous Palestinians. Set
against the backdrop of the fiftieth anniversaries of both the
establishment of the State of Israel, and the proclamation of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the author partially surveys
Israel's prolonged violation of Palestinian human rights and argues
that the Jewish state is a racist state owing to its unwavering
commitment to Zionism. Drawing on a variety of authoritative and
independent sources, the author offers a thorough analysis of the
history and central tenets of Zionism. This is followed by a detailed
examination ofa selection ofIsraeli laws and policies that have violated
the human rights of the Palestinian people since the conquest of
Palestine in 1948. Concerned with the moral and political implications
of Israel's continued persecution of the Palestinian people, the author
concludes that as long as the international community continues to
tolerate the existence of Israel as a state based on doctrines of
exclusivism and racism, a just settlement to the conflict in the Middle
East will never be realized.
L 'ampleur de la violation des droits de la personne contre les
Palestiniens a ete bien documentee par des specialistes independants et
fB.A. Hons. (University of Toronto), LL.B. anticipated 1999 (Dalhousie). The author is
indebted to Dr. Esmeralda Thornhill, Dr. Ismail Zayid and Rema Jamous for offering valuable
commentary on an earlier draft of this article. The author also gratefully acknowledges the
research assistance of Lynn Duquette.
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des organisations intergouvernementales et non-gouvernementales
comme ! 'Organisation des Nations-Unies, "Amnestie Internationale"
et "Human Rights Watch." Cependant, peu a ete ecrit sur le role de
l 'ideologie o.fficielle de l 'Etat israelien vis-a-vis les Palestiniens.
Voyant venir le quinzieme anniversaire de la Constitution de l 'Etat
d 'Israel et la proclamation de la "Declaration universelle des droits de
l'homme," !'auteur regarde partiellement le prolongement de la
violation des droits de la personne des Palestiniens par Israel et
argumente que l 'Etat juif est un etat raciste du a ses obligations
imperatives au sionisme, l 'ideologie coloniale du dix-neuvieme siecle,
concernant la notion que la Palestine est un droit donne au monde juif.
Donnant une variete de sources credibles et independantes, I 'auteur
offre une analyse de l 'histoire et les principes importants du sionisme.
Cela est suivi par une examination detaillee d'une selection des droits et
politiques d' Israel qui ant viole les droits de la personne des
Palestiniens depuis la conquete de Palestine en 1948. Avec les
implications morales et politiques d 'Israel, qui constituent la
persecution des Palestiniens, ! 'auteur conclue qu 'aussi longtemps que
la communaute internationale continuera a tolerer l 'existence d' Israel
comme etant basee sur la doctrine de l'exclusivite et de racisme, une
entente afin d'arreter les conjlits dans le Mayen-Orient ne serajamais
realisee.
"[F]aith in my fellow man makes me confident that the wretched and
degrading effect of the Arab heritage [in Palestine} will not last
forever. " 1
David Ben-Gurion
Israeli Prime Minister, 1948-53, 1955-63
"There are, however, some instances in certain societies in which
groups, victims of racialistic practices, have themselves applied
doctrines with racist implications. " 2
Fourth UNESCO Statement on Race and Racial Prejudice
Paris, September 1967

1
D. Ben-Gurion, Ben-Gurion Looks Back in Talks with Moshe Pearlman (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1965) at 161.
2
UNESCO, Four Statements on the Race Question (Paris: UNESCO, 1969) at 52.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The year 1998 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of
the state of Israel, and for many of its supporters, it was an opportune
time to rejoice in the creation of a democratic, "pioneering state, full of
hope and promise for the survivors of the Nazi Holocaust."3 In the host
of celebrations that took place to commemorate the event, however, the
recognition of the plight of the Palestinian people-whose mass
expulsion from Palestine was a necessary requirement for the
establishment of the Jewish state4-was conspicuously absent. In the
words of Edward Said, "[i]f they're not mentioned, they don't exist."5
Indeed, the phenomenon of denying the very existence of the
Palestinians has been one of the primary tools employed by the state of
Israel in its interminable effort to obfuscate the part it has played in the
virtual destruction of an entire people. 6 Moreover, it has also been the
central phenomenon upon which Israel's systematic dehumanization of
the Palestinian people has been based. As a result, Israel has been able to
maintain and sustain with virtual impunity, a protracted assault on
Palestinian human rights since 1948. The historical record has indeed
shown that, fifty years into its creation, the state of Israel has largely
been successful in its attempt to-as its inaugural Prime Minister so
aptly put it-rid Palestine of the "wretched and degrading effect" of its
"Arab heritage." 7
For the international community, 1998 was also an imp01iant year
for ushering in another fiftieth anniversary-that of the proclamation of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). 8 Based upon the
3

E. Said, "Fifty Years of Dispossession" Hmper's Magazine (October 1998) at 19.
Some of the most recent and authoritative works that expound on this phenomenon
include: B. Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refi1gee Problem, 1947-1949 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987) and 1948 and After (London: Oxford University Press,
1994); N. Masalha, Expulsion ofthe Palestinians: The Concept of Transfer in Zionist Political
Thought, 1882-1948 (Washington DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992), and A Land
Without a People (London: Faber and Faber, 1997).
5
Said, supra note 3 at 19.
6
For further commentary on this phenomenon, see il1fi·a note 87. See also T. Janice,
"Zionist Attitudes Toward Arabs" (1976) 6 J. of Palestine Studies 67; A. Taylor, "Vision and
Intent in Zionist Thought" and E.B. Childers, "The Wordless Wish: From Citizens to
Refugees" in I. Abu-Lughod, ed., The Transformation ofPalestine: Essays on the Origin and
Development of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971).
7
Ben-Gurion, supra note 1.
8
GA Res. 217 A (III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, at 71, UN Doc. A/810 (1948)
[hereinafter UDHR].
4
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principles enunciated in the United Nations Charter, 9 the UDHR was
promulgated in December 1948 in an attempt to set a normative
standard to which all peoples and governments would be held with
respect to the protection of individual and collective human rights. In
1966, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 10 (with
its Optional Protocol) 11 and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights 12 were combined with the UDHR to form
what is commonly referred to as the International Bill of Rights. 13
Together, these documents constitute the core of modem international
human rights law, the totality of which has come to include a plethora of
other covenants, protocols, conventions, declarations, principles,
guidelines, and regulations of both a regional and international variety. 14
Of all signatories to the International Bill of Rights, 15 the state of
Israel is arguably the most notorious in its contravention of the same. 16
"In point of fact," according to Rabbi Elmer Berger, the renowned
American-Jewish human rights advocate, "there is hardly a single right
specified in the 30 articles of the Universal Declaration [of Human
Rights], which Israel offers ... to the ... Palestinians." 17 The irony of
Israel's moral turpitude regarding its prolonged violation of Palestinian
human rights is highlighted by the fact that the UDHR was originally

26 June 1945, XV U.N.C.1.0. 335, 145 B.F.S.P. 805, C.T.S. 1945/7.
(1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
11
(1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 302 [hereinafter Optional Protocol to ICCPR].
12
(1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
13
H. Kindred, ed., International Law, 5th ed. (Toronto: Edmond Montgomery Publications
Ltd., 1993) at 589-643. In 1989, the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, 15 December
1989, 29 I.L.M. 1464, was added to the International Bill of Rights.
14
Although this study will draw on a number of these human rights instruments, the major
part of its discussion will be informed by the International Bill of Rights. For a comprehensive
catalogue of international human rights instruments, see United Nations, Human Rights: A
Compilation of International Instruments (New York: Center For Human Rights, 1993).
15
Israel ratified the UDHR in 1948; the ICESCR in 1991; the ICCPR in 1992 (it has yet to
ratify any of the Optional Protocol's thereto).
16
For comparisons between Apartheid South Africa and Israel on this score, see Moleah,
inji·a note 19; D. Will and S. Ryan, Israel and South Aji-ica: Legal Systems of Settler
Dominance (Trenton N.J.: Africa World Press, 1990); and R.P. Stevens and A.M. Elmessiri,
Israel and South Afi'ica: The Progression of a Relationship (New York: New World Press,
1976).
17
E. Berger, "Israeli Law in the Light of General Principles of Human Rights" in H.
Kochler, ed., The Legal Aspects of the Palestine Problem with Special Regard to the Question
ofJerusalem (Wien: Wilhelm Braumuller, 1981) 240 at 241.
9

10
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fashioned in response to "revelations of the atrocities committed in
various parts of Europe" during World War II 18-specifically the Nazi
holocaust of the Jews. 19 This irony, therefore, begs the inevitable
question: how is it that "a people so long subjected to exclusion and
discrimination and the ultimate horror of the [Nazi] holocaust" 20 can
now be capable of subjugating another people? Invariably, the answer
lies in acquiring a full understanding of the political and cultural
ideology upon which the modern state oflsrael has become based-that
of Zionism. 21
This paper will partially survey Israel's fifty year assault on
Palestinian human rights in an effort to illustrate that, far from the
democratic state that it claims to be, it is in fact a racist state whose very
existence is predicated on notions of exclusion and discrimination against
those unfortunate enough to be legally and effectively classified as "nonJews" under Israeli law: the indigenous Palestinians. To this end, an indepth analysis of the history and basic precepts of Zionism will be
undertaken with a view to expose the racist nature of the central
ideological paradigm that has informed virtually every law and policy the
state of Israel has ever applied to the Palestinian people. This will be
followed by an analysis of a number of those laws and policies, so that the
reader may better comprehend both the heavy human toll the Palestinian
people have had to pay in their struggle to maintain their own existence,
and, more importantly, the ideological canons that have inspired an
historically persecuted people to assume the ill-befitting role of
persecutors of another.

Kindred, supra note 13 at 590.
A.T. Moleah, "Violations of Palestinian Human Rights: South African Parallels" (1981)
10:2 J. of Palestine Studies 14 at 19.
20
Ibid. at 17.
21
The term "Zionism" is properly categorized into two distinct strains: "cultural Zionism"
and "political Zionism." The contemporary tenn "Zionism," as has been used since the
establishment of the state oflsrael in 1948, almost always refers to political Zionism. For the
difference between these two brands of Zionism, see infi·a note 22.
18

19
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II. BACKGROUND
1. Zionism: What is it?
Modem political Zionism22 emerged in late-nineteenth century Europe
as a reaction to hundreds of years of anti-Jewish persecution, which took
the form of "repeated pogroms, mass murder and, [eventually] under
Nazism . . . mass annihilation." 23 Convinced of the futility of
assimilation as a means to alleviate their plight as a marginalized
minority among "Gentiles," proponents of Zionism called for the
establishment of an exclusively "Jewish state" in the land of their
biblical forefathers: Palestine. 24 This state would serve as a haven from
the tyranny of Gentile Europe and would be premised on Jewish selfsufficiency and self-reliance. In the words of one of the Zionist
movement's most prominent leaders, Chaim Weizmann, 25 Palestine was
to be transformed into a state that would become "as Jewish as England
is English."26
One of the first major proponents of the Zionist movement was an
Austrian-Jewish playwright named Theodore Herzl. Widely regarded as
the "Father of Zionism," the 1896 publication of his pamphlet, Der
Judenstaat (The Jewish State), gave rise to a wave of Zionist fervor

22
It is important to note that early Zionism found expression in various streams of thought,
the two most prominent of which were "political Zionism" and "cultural Zionism." Both
sought to bring an end to years of Jewish suffering in Europe by looking to colonize and settle
Palestine, their biblical "promised land." However, while the former "emphasized the
importance of a politically independent Jewish state" as the only means to bring this
emancipation about, the latter was "deeply moved by a Jewish cultural renaissance," which
viewed settlement in Palestine not "as a political or economic program but as a basis of a
cultural center which would give the Jews a quickening sense of their own ... special role."
Although many Zionists of the cultural stripe had settled in Palestine prior to the tum of the
nineteenth century, by 1904 the political Zionists came to dominate Jewish life in the country
and the Zionist movement altogether. As such, when one speaks of "Zionism" in the
contemporary period, it should be taken to refer to that form of political Zionism that called for
the establishment of an exclusively Jewish state in Palestine in the first half of this century, and
which eventually culminated in the establishment of that state (Israel) in 1948. See Taylor,
supra note 6 at 14ff.
23
U. Davis, Israel: An Apartheid State (London: Zed Books, 1987) at I.
24 See infra text accompanying notes 31 and 37. See also ibid. at 1-2.
25
Later the first President of the State of Israel, 1949-52.
26
J. Quigley, Palestine and Israel: A Challenge to Justice (Durham: Duke University
Press, 1990) at 12.
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among central and eastern European anti-assimilationist Jews. This
fervor soon materialized in the form of the first World Zionist Congress
held at Basle, Switzerland in 1897 ,27 where the World Zionist
Organization (WZO) was founded and charged with leading the effort to
create an independent Jewish state in Palestine.
Like every political and socio-cultural paradigm, Zionism was a
product of both its age and environment. As such, the movement was
founded on, and deeply imbued with, nineteenth-century European
notions of colonialism, imperialism, and racism. 28 This was a fact
readily admitted by Herzl himself, who often boasted of Zionism as a
"colonial idea,"29 and who viewed a future Jewish state in Palestine as
forming "a portion of the rampart of Europe against Asia, an outpost of
civilization as opposed to barbarism." 30 At a time when the secular
nationalist European social order was being thrust upon world like never
before, Zionist thinkers made every effort to model their emancipatory
movement accordingly. In the words of one of Herzl's co-ideologists,
Joachim Prinz:
The collapse of Jewish anonymity is now clear to everyone. Jews are
now torn away from the last hiding place . . . . The theory of
assimilation [into European Gentile society] has been destroyed.
There is no longer any hiding place for us under the negation which
protected it. We [the leaders of the Zionist movement] want to posit
instead of assimilation something new: undertaking the yoke of
joining the Jewish people and the Jewish race. Only a state based on
the principle of the purity of the nation and the race can possibly
endow dignity and honour on (and only on) those Jews who
themselves subscribe to this principle. The state cannot desire any
other Jews except those who subscribe to this principle amongst their
own people. It cannot desire to have sycophantic Jews. It must demand
Ibid. at 4.
See R.P. Stevens, "Zionism as a Phase of Western Imperialism" in Abu Lughod, supra
note 6 at 27ff.
29
A. Schliefer, The Fall ofJerusalem (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972) at 23, as
quoted in Quigley, supra note 26 at 7. In fact, "In 1902 Herzl approached Cecil Rhodes, who
had recently colonized the territory of the Shona people of Rhodesia. 'You are being invited to
help make history,' he said in a letter to Rhodes. 'It doesn't involve Africa, but a piece of Asia
Minor; not Englishmen but Jews. How then, do I happen to turn to you since this is an out-ofthe-way matter for you? How indeed? Because it is something colonial."' [emphasis added];
R. Patai, ed., The Complete Diaries of Theodore Herzl (1960) at 1194 as quoted in Quigley,
supra note 26 at 7.
30
T. Herzl, Der Judenstaat, as quoted in Davis, supra note 23 at 4.
27
28
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from us recognition of our absolute uniqueness and qualities, since
only those who give full honour to their own uniqueness, their own
blood, could gain the respect and honour which are bestowed by
similarly inspired nations subscribing to the same principle.
[emphasis added]3 1

In its early days, the Zionist movement faced various problems in
implementing its program: political in-fighting, resistance from proassimilationist Jews, and simple lack of "colonizing" resources to name
but a few. Zionism's central problem, however, was the fact that at the
tum of the nineteenth century, Palestine was a country inhabited by well
over half a million indigenous Palestinian Arabs (approximately eightyeight percent Muslim, twelve percent Christian) who had been rooted in
the land for well over two millennia. 32 Herein lies the central dilemma
posed by Zionism as a colonial movement, and the very crux of the
conflict in the Middle East itself: how would it be possible to establish
an exclusively Jewish state in Palestine, if there already existed a
substantial number of non-Jews, that is Palestinian Arabs, in it?
Initially, Zionist leaders attempted to conceal this dilemma from
their constituents by fabricating myths that Palestine was a barren and
uninhabited country. The movement was thus publicized as a virtuous
effort to give "a land without a people" to "a people without a land." 33 In
reality, however, Zionist leadership had always been aware of the
inevitability of the need to remove, by force if necessary, the indigenous
people of Palestine if the goal of establishing an exclusively Jewish state
in that country was to be achieved. Thus, in his private diaries (under the
heading When We Occupy The Country), Herzl himself proclaimed the
need to "gently expropriate private [Palestinian] property," and to
try to spirit the penniless population [i.e. indigenous Palestinians]
across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit
countries, while denying it any employment in our own country ....
Both the process of expropriation and the removal of the poor [i.e.
indigenous Palestinians] must be carried out discreetly and
circumspectly. Let the owners of immovable property believe that they
Davis, supra note 23 at 1-2.
J.L. Abu-Lughod, "The Demographic Transformation of Palestine" in Abu-Lughod,
supra note 6 at 140.
33
The original slogan-Das Land ohne Volk: Das Volk ohne Land-was coined by Max
Nordau, contemporary of Theodore Herzl and "one of the most famous European orators of
Zionism." See Childers, supra note 6 at 168.
31

32
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are cheating us, selling us things for more than they are worth. But we
are not going to sell them anything back .... We shall sell only to Jews
and all real estate will be traded only among Jews. [emphasis added] 34

As the Zionist program in Palestine developed, though, its requirement
of the wholesale expulsion of the country's native people became
anything but "discreet." The concept of "Transfer"-"a euphemism
denoting the organized removal of the indigenous population of
Palestine to neighboring countries"-soon emerged as one of the central
policies of the Zionist movement. 35 Accordingly, it was JosefWeitz36one of the principle architects of the "Transfer" policy in the 1920s, 30s,
and 40s-who brazenly proclaimed it as the "only solution" to the
obstacle the indigenous Arabs posed to the Zionist plan to colonize the
country:
Among ourselves it must be clear that there is no place in the country
for both peoples together .... With the Arabs we shall not achieve our
aim of being independent people in this country. The only solution is
Eretz Israel [i.e. the Land oflsrael] ... without the Arabs . .. and there
is no other way but to transfer the Arabs from here to the neighboring
countries, transfer all of them, not one village or tribe should remain,
and the transfer must aim at Iraq, Syria and even Transjordan. For this
purpose money will be found, much money; and only with this transfer
could the count1y absorb millions of our brothers. There is no other
alternative .... One should investigate now the neighboring countries
in order to detennine their capacity to absorb the Arabs ofEretz Israel.
[emphasis added]3 7

Although Weitz made this comment in 1940, transfer theory was deeply
embedded in Zionist political thinking from the very inception of the
movement. According to Nur Masalha, author of the most definitive text
on the subject:

34
W. Lehn and U. Davis, The Jewish National Fund (London: Kegan Paul International,
1988) at 13.
35
For the most definitive text on the concept of"Transfer" in Zionist political thought, see
Masalha, Expulsion of the Palestinians, supra note 4 at lff.
36
Deputy Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Jewish National Fund (JNF) (195173); Head of the Plant and Afforestation Department of the JNF (1918-32); Director of the
Land Development Division of the JNF (1932-59); Chairman of the Subcommittee for
Naming Agricultural Settlements and Chainnan of the Land Development Council of the JNF
(1960-67). Davis, supra note 23 at 5.
37
Ibid.

<
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It should not be imagined that the concept of transfer was held only by

maximalists or extremists within the Zionist movement. On the
contrary, it was embraced by almost all shades of opinion, from the
Revisionist right to the Labour left. Virtually every member of the
Zionist pantheon of founding fathers and important leaders supported
it and advocated it in one form or another, from Chaim Weizmann and
Vladimir Jabotinsky to David Ben-Gurion and Menahem Ussishkin.
Supporters of transfer included such moderates as the "Arab appeaser"
Moshe Shertok and the socialist Arthur Ruppin, founder of Brit
Shalom, a movement advocating equal rights for Arabs and Jews.
More i111portantly, transfer proposals were put forward by the Jewish
Agency itself, in effect the government of the Yishuv. [i.e. pre-1948
Jewish community in Palestine]3 8

A consummate analysis of the history and development of Zionism
is well beyond the scope of this study, but the foregoing analysis of the
basic fundamentals of the movement provides a general understanding
of its meaning and implications to both Jews and Palestinians. Like all
other colonial ideologies, Zionism did not, and still does not, operate in
a vacuum. While it offered the promise of emancipation from centuries
of Jewish persecution by Christian Europe, it could only fulfill this
promise by dispossessing and expelling another people-who were
innocent of any wrongdoing to the Jews-from their only homeland. As
such, a complete understanding of Zionism must lead one to the
following three conclusions regarding its stated goal of establishing an
exclusively Jewish state in Palestine: first, "conquest of the land" was
the single most important prerequisite to the creation of the Jewish
state; 39 second, the "ingathering of the exiles" (i.e. settlement of Jewish
immigrants) was imperative if that state was to become a tangible
reality; 40 and third, the "transfer," or expulsion, of the indigenous Arabs
from Palestine was required if exclusive Jewish sovereignty over the
country was to be realized. 41

Masalha, supra note 4 at 2. This work is based primarily on recently declassified Israeli
state and private archival materials. For a shorter Israeli examination of the question of
transfer in Zionist political thought, see I. Shahak, "A History of the Concept of Transfer in
Zionism" (1989) 17:3 J. of Palestine Studies 22.
39
See G. Shafir, Land, Labour and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 18821914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) at l 13ff.
40
Davis, supra note 23 at 16.
41
Masalha, Expulsion of the Palestinians, supra note 4.
38
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As history would show, these three tenets, as expressed by
successive leaders of the Zionist establishment, would come to shape
virtually every aspect of Palestinian-Jewish/Israeli relations both before
and after the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. More
importantly, for our purposes, they would also come to serve as the basis
of numerous Israeli laws and policies that would engender five decades
of flagrant human rights violations against the Palestinian people.
Before examining those laws in depth, however, it is important to
establish the socio-political context in which those laws have operated
through a survey of Zionism's role in the development of the
contemporary conflict over Palestine.
2. Zionism and the Conquest of Palestine
The first Zionist colony in Palestine was established at Rishon Letzion
(south-east of Jaffa) in 1882. 42 At that time the country was governed by
the Ottoman Empire as a portion of Greater Syria. 43 Zionist immigration
between 1882 and 1917 placed the percentage of Jewish inhabitants in
Palestine at approximately five percent by the end of World War I.44
A ware that the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was imminent, and that
British control over Palestine was likely following the conclusion of the
war, 45 Zionist leaders lobbied hard to gain assurances for their colonial
program from London. As a result-and only a year after London had
promised to endorse Arab independence in Palestine46-the infamous
42

"Rishon Letzion" is Hebrew for "First in Zion." Shafir, supra note 39 at 50ff.
Greater Syria was comprised of the area that now includes Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Israel
and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. "Administratively, Palestine was divided into a
vilayet (administrative division) extending in the north from Sidon (now in Lebanon) to the
south ofNablus and administered by the [Ottoman] government in Beirut; the territory from
that point southward, including the city of Jerusalem, to the borders of the Sinai Peninsula
comprised the sanjak (district) of Jerusalem and was administered directly by the central
government in Istanbul; while the territory along the eastern borders of the River Jordan
formed the southern part of the vilayet of Syria and constituted the sanjaks of Hauran and
Ma'an, administered from Damascus": S. Hadawi, Palestinian Rights and Losses in 1948: A
Comprehensive Study (London: Saqi Books, 1988) at 3.
44
Ibid. at 27.
45 The British Foreign Office considered the control of Palestine as essential to maintaining
its control over the rest of its Afro-Asian Empire. It was believed that a "foothold in Palestine
would provide protection for Britain's vital Cape-to-Cairo and Cairo-to-India routes."
Quigley, supra note 26 at 9.
46
These pledges came in the form of the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence of 1915-16,
in which the British government received Arab guarantees to "join their ranks" against the
43

12
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Balfour Declaration was pronounced in November 1917, in which the
British government pledged its support for "the establishment in
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people."47 By 1918, the
Ottoman Empire had effectively been dismembered, and in 1922 the
League of Nations granted the Mandate over Palestine to the British, as
was expected.
By that time, the Arab national movement-itself a product of the
nineteenth century-had gained strong support among the Arabs of
Palestine. After having participated in the struggle to free the western
Arab world from Ottoman domination by helping the British defeat
them in World War I, the Palestine Arabs believed that their
independence was close at hand. With the commencement of the British
Mandate over Palestine in 1922, and with London's insistence that the
Balfour Declaration fonnally be incorporated into the terms of the
Mandate, however, Palestinian nationalists increasingly became
convinced of the existence of a conspiracy to dupe them out of their
legitimate rights to self-determination. As Zionist immigration to the
Ottomans during World War I in return for post-War Arab independence in various areas of
the Levant including Palestine. For a more thorough discussion of the Correspondence, see
Hadawi, supra note 43 at 11 ff.
47
The full text of the declaration read as follows:
His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best
endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly
understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and
religious rights of existing 11011-Jewish communities in Palestine or the
rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country. [emphasis
added]
Interestingly enough, at the time the Declaration was concluded between the British Foreign
Secretary, Lord Arthur James Balfour, and the World Zionist Organization, the Palestinian
Arabs constituted approximately ninety-two percent of the total population of Palestine.
Nevertheless, the drafters of the document chose to refer to them in negative terms as the
"existing non-Jewish communities." As Sarni Hadawi has pointed out, "This tended to give the
erroneous impression that they were an insignificant minority occupying a position
subordinate to the Jewish minority .... The Declaration was described as a document where
one nation [Britain] solemnly promised to a second nation [the Jews] the country ofa third [the
Palestinians]." When challenged on the "prejudicial" effects that the document was sure to
have on the innocent third-party Palestinian Arabs, Lord Arthur Balfour's response was quite
revealing indeed: "In Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting
the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country .... The four great Powers are committed
to Zionism. And Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long traditions, in
present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the
700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land." Ibid. at 15-16.
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country increased, Jewish leaders in Palestine forged ahead with their
project of constructing an exclusionist state-within-a-state, which
inevitably led to clashes with the indigenous Arab population. Among
other things, the openly racist policies of Zionist land acquisition-that
saw Jews purchase Arab land and subsequently declare it the
"inalienable property of the Jewish people" by refusing to re-sell it to
Arabs or to allow Arab labour on it48-were cited by various
independent commissions as being the cause of Arab protests in 1920,
1921, and 1929. 49
Tensions reached a fever-pitch in 1936, when the indigenous Arabs
brought the country to a standstill with mass protests and strikes in what
came to be known as the Arab Revolt. In response to these
developments, the British Mandatory government enacted the Palestine
(Defence) Order in Council (1937), imposing martial law on the whole
country. By 1939, the revolt was crushed and "order" was restored, but
the state of emergency continued to remain in force, initially by way of
the Emergency Powers (Defence of the Colonies) Order in Council
(1939) and the Defence Emergency Regulations (1945). 50 Nevertheless,
as Zionist immigration increased-most notably during World War IItensions between Jews and Arabs continually flared. By 1947, the
situation had deteriorated to such a point that the British formally
announced their intention to quit the Mandate, and handed the matter
over to the newly formed United Nations (UN). After lengthy
deliberations, the General Assembly decided to partition Palestine into a
Jewish State and an Arab State by way of Resolution 181 (II) of
November 29, 194751 -a proposition that was viewed as patently unjust
and wholly unacceptable to the indigenous Arabs of the country. 52
By that year, Zionist immigration and settlement had brought the
population of Palestine to approximately two-thirds Arab (Muslim and
48

See inji'a text accompanying notes 123, 131, 133, 135, 148, 149.
For instance, see the Palin Commission Report (1920); the Haycraft Commission Report
(1921); the Shaw Commission Report (1929); and the Hope Simpson Report (1929). Hadawi,
supra note 43 at 69ff.
50
M. Hofnung, Democracy, Law and National Security in Israel (Aldershot: Dartmouth
Publishing, 1996) at 49.
51
GA Res. 181 (II), UN GAOR, 2d Sess, UN Doc. A/310 (1947) [hereinafter Partition
Resolution].
52
S. Hadawi, Bitter Harvest: Palestine Between 1914-1967 (New York: New World Press,
1967) at 94-96. In fact, the injustice of the partition was also recognized by none other than
Mahatma Gandhi, who, upon learning of the prospect of partition, exclaimed that "it would be
a crime against humanity to reduce the proud Arabs so that Palestine can be restored to the
Jews, partly or wholly as their national home." Quigley, supra note 26 at 25-26.
49
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Christian) and one-third Jewish. 53 Under the UN part1t10n plan,
however, fifty-six percent of the country was allotted to the Jewish State
and only forty-three precent was allotted to the Arab State. 54 Moreover,
the estimated population of the Jewish State was to be approximately
498,000 Jews to 497,000 Arabs. 55 This was a demographic nightmare
for the Zionists who, as noted above, were bent on ensuring the "purity"
of their Jewish state. Unbeknownst to them at the time, however, they
would have ample opportunity to implement the long-held Zionist plan
of "transfer" during the first Arab-Israeli war that followed immediately
after partition. In the words of Josef Weitz, "it was a time ... during
which opportunities were not missed." 56
Over the course of the war, which lasted from December 1947 to
July 1949, Israeli forces managed to conquer a further twenty-two
percent of the country, bringing their total land occupation at war's end
to seventy-eight percent of Mandatory Palestine. 57 The remainder of the
country-the West Bank and Gaza Strip-was portioned out to
Jordanian and Egyptian administration, respectively. More important
than the Zionists' land acquisition, however, was the efficient manner in
which they "cleansed" their new state of its "non-Jewish" character.
According to Israeli historian Benny Morris, between 600,000 and
760,000 Palestinians were expelled from the country during the war, 58
and a total of 369 Palestinian villages were destroyed so as to prevent
any possibility of their return. 59 What would be described by Chaim

53 According to Hadawi, supra note 43 at 26, the exact figures were as follows: 1,415,000
Arabs and 700,000 Jews.
54
The remainder was to incorporate Jerusalem and its immediate environs under a corpus
separatum. Ibid. at 79-80.
55
Ibid. at 80.
56
Masalha, Expulsion of the Palestinians, supra note 4 at 208.
57
Hadawi, supra note 43 at 81.
58
The actual number of Palestinian refugees from 1948 has always been disputed. Arab
officials have traditionally estimated it to be as high as 900,000, while their Israeli
counterparts have usually cited 520,000. In 1949, the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) recorded numbers as high as 960,000. See L.
Takkenberg, The Status of Palestinian Refi1gees in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1998) at 18ff.
59 Morris, Birth of the Palestinian Refi1gee Problem, 1947-1949, supra note 4 at xiv-xviii.
Other sources have estimated the number of destroyed villages to be as high as 418. See W.
Khalidi, All That Remains (Washington DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992).
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Weizmann as "a miraculous clearing of the land,"60 was actually a
planned 61 ethnic-cleansing campaign that included both forced
expulsion and massacre. 62 Perpetrated by Jewish troops and terrorist
gangs, 63 these atrocities ultimately encouraged the mass flight of Arabs
in neighboring villages. 64 By the end of the hostilities, only 140,000
60

Masalha, Expulsion of the Palestinians, supra note 4 at 175.
According to Se/er Toldot Ha-Haganah, the official history of the Haganah or "Israel
Defence Force," the plan was officially known as Tochnit Dalet, or "Plan D." Originally
drawn up in 1944 by the Haganah O.C. Operations, Yigal Yadin, Plan D provided a
comprehensive military scheme to enlarge the boundaries of the Jewish state beyond those
demarcated by the UN partition resolution of 1947 and to conquer Arab towns and villages
situated in areas that came under Jewish control. As noted by Nur Masalha, Plan D "was
anchored in the politico-ideological concept of transfer," and "according to the basic
guidelines of this plan ... section after section of the country was conquered ... and tens of
thousands of Arabs were expelled or driven to flee." See ibid. at 177-78.
62
Some of the more notorious massacres took place at Safsaf (29 October 1948); AlDawayima (29 October 1948); and Deir Yassin (9-10 April 1948). The following eye-witness
account of the al-Dawayima massacre was given by an Israeli solder who was in the town the
day after it was occupied by Israeli forces:
The conquering army was Battalion 89 .... They killed some 80-100
Arabs, women and children. The children were killed by smashing their
skulls with clubs. There was not a single house without dead .... In the
village there remained Arab men and women who were put in the houses
without food or drink. Then the sappers came to blow up the houses. One
officer ordered a sapper to put two old women into the house he was about
to blow up. The sapper refused, and said that he would obey only such
orders as were handed down to him by his immediate commander. So the
officer ordered his own solders to put the old women in, and the atrocity
was carried out. Another soldier boasted that he had raped an Arab woman
and then shot her. Another Arab woman with a day-old baby was
employed in cleaning jobs in the yard .... She worked for one or two days
in the service, and then she was shot, together with her baby .... Cultured and
well mannered commanders who are considered good fellows ... have turned
into low murderers, and this happened not in the storm ofthe battle and blind
passion, but because of a system of expulsion and annihilation. The fewer the
Arabs [that] remain the better. [emphasis added]
E. Kafkafi, "A Ghetto Attitude in the Jewish State", Davar (Hebrew Daily) (6 September
1979) as quoted in Davis, supra note 23 at 8. For personal accounts of other massacres given
by Israeli eyewitnesses see Davis, supra note 23 at 4-9.
63
In fact, it was the Irgun and LEHI terrorist groups-led by future Israeli Prime Ministers
Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir, respectively-that perpetrated the massacre of
approximately 250 men, women and children at Deir Yassin on 9-10 April, 1948. Ibid. at 6.
64
Needless to say, the forced expulsion and massacre of Palestinian civilians during the
war has traditionally been denied by successive Israeli governments, who have always
maintained that Arab leaders of the day instructed the Palestinians to leave their homes in
order to make the task of destroying the fledgling Jewish state easier. Nevertheless, according
61
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Palestinians remained inside what became the state oflsrael, and the rest
of their compatriots were permanently exiled in neighbouring states. 65
In response to this catastrophe, the United Nations General
Assembly passed Resolution 194 (III) on December 11, 1948, which
called on Israel to repatriate all Palestine refugees wishing to return to
their homes, and to compensate them whether or not repatriation was
effectuated. 66 Needless to say, after having gone to unimaginable
lengths to ensure a Jewish majority in their new state, and after hundreds
of thousands of Jewish refugees from Europe "flocked into Israel and
took over the [remaining] farms and homes of the departed Arabs,"67
Israeli leaders simply refused to comply. As a result, no Palestinian
refugees were allowed to return, 68 and successive generations of their
kin, presently totaling some 3 .4 million persons, have continued to live
in forced exile for the past half century. 69
As for the Palestinians who remained inside Israel, over the course
of the next eighteen years (1948-66) they would become subject to
harsh Israeli military rule, that, according to Israeli professor
Menachem Hofnung, was designed to ensure "the fragmentation and
division of the Arab population." 70 On May 19, 1948, the Provisional
Council of State (the precursor to the Israeli Knesset, or parliament)

to Benny Morris, an Israeli historian who based his definitive Birth of the Palestinian Refi1gee
Problem, 1947-1949 on recently de-classified Israeli state documents, "in most cases the
final and decisive precipitant to [Arab] flight was Haganah, IZL, LHI or IDF [i.e. Jewish troop
or terrorist] attacks or the inhabitants' fear of such attack" (at 294). "I have found no
evidence," states Morris, "to show that the AHC [Arab Higher Committee] issued blanket
instructions, by radio or otherwise, to Palestine's Arabs to flee" (at 290). Supra note 4.
65
Masalha, Expulsion of the Palestinians, supra note 4 at 199.
66 GA Res. 194 (III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., UN Doc. A/810, para. 11 (1948). The full text of
the provision reads as follows:
That the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with
their neighbours should be pennitted to do so at the earliest practicable
date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those
choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under
principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the
Governments or authorities responsible.
67 Takkenberg, supra note 58 at 13.
68 This is with the minor exception of an extremely small number of refugees whom Israel
allowed to return in the context of family reunification in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Ibid.
at 5.
69
Ibid. at 20-21.
70 Hofnung, supra note 50 at 95.
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"decided to declare a state of emergency under the Defence
(Emergency) Regulations (1945)"-an amended version of the same
regulations employed by the British to crush the Arab Revolt of 1936. 71
Under Regulation 125 of this legislation, local military commanders
were empowered to "exercise legislative, judicial and executive powers
over extensive spheres of life," including the demolition of homes,
imposition of curfews, collective punishment, deportation, arbitrary
arrest, and search and detention. 72 The imposition of a South African
style "pass system" was employed to restrict Arab movement into and
out of predominately Jewish areas. Ironically, when these same
regulations had been passed by the British during the mandate, they
were denounced by Zionist leaders as "licensed tenorism" that was
worse than Nazi legislation during World War Il. 73 Although the
71

Davis, supra note 23 at 64.
Hofnung, supra note 50 at 50. See also Quigley, supra note 26 at 102-3.
73
The insight of just two such leaders is highly revealing, to say the least. In 1946, Mr.
Yaacov Shimshon Shapira, subsequently legal advisor to the new government of Israel and
later Minister of Justice, made the following pronouncement regarding the Defence
(Emergency) Regulations (1945):
The established order in Palestine since the Defence Regulations is
unparalleled in any civilized country. Even in Nazi Germany there were no
such laws . . . . Only in an occupied count1y do you find a system
resembling ours. They try to reassure us by saying that these laws apply
only to offenders and not to the whole of the population, but the Nazi
governor of occupied Oslo also said that no hann would come to those
who minded their own business .... It is our duty to tell the whole world
that the Defense Regulations passed by the [British Mandatory]
government in Palestine destroy the very foundations of justice in this
land. It is mere euphemism to call the military courts "comis." To use the
Nazi title, they are not better than "Military Judicial Committees Advising
the Generals." No government has the right to draw up such laws ....
In the same year, Mr. Dov Yosef (Bernard Joseph) of the Jewish Agency, also subsequently
Minister of Justice, made the following statement:
As for these Defence Regulations, the question is: Are we all to become
victims of officially licensed terrorism or will the freedom of the
individual prevail? Is the administration to be allowed to interfere in the
lives of the people with no protection for the individual? As it is, there is
no guarantee to prevent a citizen from being imprisoned for life without
trial. There is no protection for the freedom of the individual: there is no
appeal against the decision of the military commander, no means of
resorting to the Supreme Court . . . while the administration has
unrestricted freedom to banish any citizen at any moment. What is more, a
man does not actually have to commit an offense; it is enough for a
decision to be made in some office for his fate to be sealed .... The
72
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military government was formally abolished in 1966, Israel has
maintained its state of emergency under the Defence (Emergency)
Regulations (1945) to this day. As such, its Palestinian citizens continue
to be de facto subject to the same military laws that prevailed between
1948 and 1966.
With the Israeli conquest of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in July
1967, the Zionist goal of acquiring all of the ten-it01y of the former
Palestine Mandate had been accomplished. Owing to its speedy six-day
"blitzkrieg victory,'' 74 however, the same scale of ethnic cleansing that
took place in the 1948 war could not be achieved. Even though an
additional 440,000 Palestinian refugees had been created, 75
approximately 1.4 million Palestinians had remained in the newly
acquired territories. 76 From a Zionist standpoint, this created the
ultimate catch-22: should Israel fonnally annex the land and issue
citizenship to all of its non-Jewish inhabitants (thereby compromising
the "purity" of the Jewish state)? Or should it simply withdraw from the
ten-itories as called for by the international community through UN
Security Council Resolution 242? 77 Ultimately, the Jewish state chose to
do neither.
In a move that consolidated the long-held Zionist policy of
conquering "more land with less Arabs,''78 Israel unilaterally and
illegally decided to annex Arab East Jerusalem, 79 and to extend its
Defence (Emergency) Regulations (1945) to the remainder of the

principle of collective responsibility has become a mockery. All of the six hundred thousand
[Jewish] settlers could be hanged for a crime committed by one person in this country. A
citizen should not have to rely on the good will of an official, our lives and our property should
not be placed in the hands of an official. There is no choice between freedom and anarchy. In
a country where the administration itself inspires anger, resentment, and contempt for the
laws, one cannot expect respect for the law. It is too much to ask a citizen to respect a law that
outlaws him.
Ha-Prak/it (The Lawyer) (February, 1946) at 58-64 as quoted in S. Jiryis, The Arabs in
Israel (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976) at 11-12.
74
Davis, supra note 23 at 64.
75
This number includes approximately 200,000 second-time refugees from the 1948 war.
Takkenberg, supra note 58 at 17.
76
Quigley, supra note 26 at 168.
77
S.C. Res. 242, UN SCOR, 22th Sess., 132 Mtg., UN Doc. S/INF.Rev.2 (1967).
78
Masalha, A Land Without A People, supra note 4 at 16.
79
For a detailed examination of the illegality oflsrael's annexation of Arab East Jerusalem
see United Nations, The Status ofJerusalem (New York: United Nations, 1997) at 29-35.
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Occupied Territories, thereby imposing complete martial law on the
Palestinian inhabitants without affording them Israeli citizenship status.
Over the course of the next thirty-one years, Israel would fortify its hold
on the Territories through the legislation of hundreds of "occupiers
laws," 80 which were in flagrant violation of international humanitarian
law, most notably the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. 81 Among other things,
these laws made it "legal" to confiscate Arab lands, construct Jewish
settlements on those lands, demolish homes, arrest, search and detain
without explanation, exploit natural resources, deport local leaders, and
impose curfews and collective punishment of virtually every sort
imaginable. In the words of Israeli human rights activist, Dr. Israel
Shahak, these laws attempted to legitimize "one of the most crnel and
repressive regimes in modem times."82
This crnelty was brought to the fore during the popular Palestinian
Uprising, or Intifadah, of 1987-1993-a nation-wide, largely nonviolent, struggle to free the Palestinian people from the Israeli
occupation of the Territories. 83 On the directive of the late Prime
80
See for instance R. Shehadeh, Occupiers Law: Israel and the West Bank (Washington
DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1988).
81
12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention] (Ratified by
Israel, 6 July 1951 ).
82
Middle East International-Supplement (May 1975) as quoted in I. Zayid, Zionism: The
Myth and the Reality (Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1980) at 65. Dr. Israel
Shahak is Chairman of the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights and a survivor ofBelsen
Concentration Camp. He has written extensively on Israel's violation of Palestinian human
rights-see for instance, "Israeli Apartheid and the Intifada" ( 1988) 30 Race & Class 1; Jewish
Hist01y, Jewish Religion: The Weight of Three Thousand Years (London: Pluto Press, 1994)
and "Israeli Law: Some Facts" in Kochler, supra note 17 at 260. For further information on the
brutality ofisrael's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza see Human Rights Watch, Torture
and Ill-Treatment: Israel's Interrogation ofPalestinians from the Occupied Territories (New
York: Human Rights Watch, 1994); and Shehadeh, supra note 80.
83
This spontaneous grassroots uprising witnessed an unprecedented level of mass
participation and mobilization at every level of Palestinian society against the Israeli
Occupation Authorities. The principle methods of civil disobedience employed by the
Palestinians during the Intifadah included daily confrontations by stone-throwing youths with
armed Israeli troops; regular mass demonstrations and rallies; road-blocks; workers' strikes;
and economic boycotts. Although the official Israeli public relations response to the Jntifadah
initially attempted to characterize it as a violent war waged and directed by Palestinian
"terrorists," the plethora of independent media, intergovernmental and non-governmental
reports on the Uprising confirmed, in the words of Israeli lawyer Reuven Kaminer, that the
Intifadah "was not 'terror,' nor could the Israeli 'information' apparatuses present it as such;"
rather it "was basically non-violent." See R. Kaminer, The Politics of Protest (Brighton:
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Minister (then Minister of Defence) Yitzhak Rabin, Israel responded
with its so-called "iron fist" policy, which authorized the use of live
ammunition, plastic-coated metal bullets, rubber-coated metal bullets,
tear gas, clubbing, and percussion grenades against unaimed civilians. 84
As a result, thousands of Palestinians (many of them children) 85 were
either killed, physically maimed and/or psychologically traumatized. 86
Despite the heavy human toll inflicted on the Palestinians during
the Intifadah, the uprising had three positive effects on the state of
affairs in the region. First, it forced the Israelis to confront the reality of
the existence of the Palestinian people as a "people," since for years, the
Zionist myth that Palestine was a "land without a people" encouraged
successive Israeli governments to refuse to recognize the existence of
the Palestinians as a "people." 87 Second, it convinced the Israelis to
agree to deal with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the
sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Finally, it
compelled the Israelis to re-think their policies regarding their
continued occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Eventually,
these and other factors would encourage Israel to participate in the 1991
Sussex Academic Press, 1996) at 42. The UN Human Rights Commission supported the
lntifadah as constituting the legitimate exercise of the "right of the Palestinian people to regain
their rights by all means in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations and with relevant United Nations resolutions." It also declared the uprising as
"a form of legitimate resistance." See Situation in Occupied Palestine, UN Commission on
Human Rights, Resolution 1988/3, para. 3, 22 February 1988, as quoted in Quigley, supra note
26 at 203.
84
Quigley, supra note 26 at 203-4.
85
J. Graff, Palestinian Children and Israeli State Violence (Toronto: NECEF, 1991).
86
On this score, "[t]he UN Human Rights Commission, using the Geneva Conventions
provision that certain violations of humanitarian law are 'grave breaches' meriting criminal
punishment for perpetrators, found a number of Israel's practices during the uprising to
constitute 'war crimes.'" UN Human Rights Commission, Question of the Violation ofHuman
Rights in Occupied Palestine, para. 3, 17 February 1989, UN Doc. E/CN.411989/L.4 ( 1989),
as quoted in Quigley, supra note 26 at 205. According to Glenn E. Robinson, "[o]ver the
course of the Intifada, nearly ten percent of the Palestinian population was killed or wounded."
See G.E. Robinson, Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution (Indianapolis:
Indiana University Press, 1997) at 39.
87
The quintessential statement to that effect was issued in 1969 by, then Israeli Prime
Minister, Golda Meir (Meyerson), who stated that 'There was no such thing as Palestinians . . . .
It was not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself as a
Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them.
They did not exist." [emphasis added] The Sunday Times, London ( 15 June 1969) as quoted in
Jiryis, supra note 73 at 239.
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Madrid Peace Conference, which ultimately paved the way for bilateral
negotiations with the PLO under the cmTent "Oslo Peace Process." 88
Initial Palestinian reactions to the Oslo process were varied, and
have remained so to this day. The optimists herald it as the dawn of a
new era in Arab-Israeli relations, one that will bring an end to Israel's
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, and pave the way for the
establishment of an independent Palestinian state. 89 The pessimists
denounce it as little more than a "high-sounding" sham, a clever
stratagem concocted only to legitimize and consolidate Israel's hold on
the Territories. 90 No matter what position one takes on the matter,
though, recent data compiled by various non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) operating in the Territories 91 has shown that the

The Oslo Peace Process emerged out of the "historic" pronouncement of the Declaration
of Principles on Interim Self Government Arrangements, 32 I.L.M. 1525 (1993) [hereinafter
DOP], concluded between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in
Washington D.C. on 13 September 1993. Under the DOP, Israel and the PLO agreed to bring
the conflict between their peoples to an end through a series of "interim negotiations" and
"agreements," in preparation for a permanent settlement of the conflict that was to be reached
no later than five years after the signing of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement (below) (i.e. May
1999). Although permanent status negotiations formally opened in May 1996, they have
constantly been stalled. To date, the following interim agreements have been concluded: the
Protocol on Economic Relations, forming annex IV of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement (Paris, 29
April 1994) 33 LL.M. 696 (1994); the Agreement 011 the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area
(Cairo, 4 May 1994) 33 LL.M. 622 (1994); the Agreement on Preparat01y Transfer ofPowers
and Responsibilities (Erez, 29 August 1994) 34 LL.M. 455 (1995); the Interim Agreement 011
the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Taba, 28 September 1995) 36 LL.M. 551 ( 1997); the
Agreement on the Tempora;y International Presence in the City of Hebron (Jerusalem, 21
January 1997) 36 LL.M. 547 (1997); the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron
(Jerusalem, 17 January 1997) 36 I.L.M. 650 (1997); and the Wye River Memorandum (Wye
River, MD, USA, 28 October 1998) 37 I.L.M. 1251.
89
See E. Silver, "Recognition at Last: Amid Protests Israel and the PLO Sign a Peace
Accord Marking a New Era" (1993) 106 Maclean 's 28(3); and "Israel-PLO Agreement Called
'Historic Achievement"' (1993) 30 UN Chronicle 12(2).
90
See for instance E. Said, Peace and Its Discontents (New York: Vintage Books, 1996).
91
These include Israeli, Palestinian and International NGOs alike. For instance, see
B'Tselem, "Human Rights Since the Implementation of the Oslo Accords: Status Report"
(December 1996), on-line: B'Tselem: The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the
Occupied Territories http://www.btselem.org/REPORTS/1996/dec_2.htm> (last modified: 18
October 1998);
LAW, "Five Years Since Oslo: A Summary of Human Rights Violations Since the
Declaration of Principles" (September 1998), on-line: LAW: The Palestinian Society for the
Protection of Human Rights and the Environment <http://www.lawsociety.org/reports/1998/
oslo5.html> (last modified: 7 October 1998); and Amnesty International, News Release MDE
88
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current peace process has done "very little ... to permanently improve
the human rights situation of the Palestinian people." 92 If anything, this
fact only serves to underscore the timely and topical importance of this
study.
The foregoing survey of the Zionist conquest of Palestine has
modestly endeavoured to outline the historical and socio-political
contexts which, despite the vigorous protest of the Palestinian people
and others, have allowed the state of Israel to promulgate laws and
legislate policies that have continually violated Palestinian human rights
for the past half-century. As we enter into an examination of some of
those laws, it is imperative to recall, and keep in mind, the three
aforementioned conclusions regarding Zionism's stated goal of
establishing an exclusively Jewish state in Palestine. First, "conquest of
the land" was the single most important prerequisite to the creation of
the Jewish state. Second, the "ingathering of the exiles" (i.e. settlement
of Jewish immigrants) was imperative if that state was to become a
tangible reality. Third, the "transfer," or wholesale expulsion, of the
indigenous Arabs from Palestine was required if exclusive Jewish
sovereignty over the country was to be realized.

III. FIFTY YEARS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN ISRAEL
AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

As noted above, the International Bill ofRights serves as the foundation
of contemporary international human rights law. The following
discussion oflsraeli violations of Palestinian human rights will be based
primarily on the rights outlined in the UDHR, the ICCPR, and the
ICESCR. Where applicable, however, the Fourth Geneva Convention
and various other instruments will be referred to during the course of the
analysis. Needless to say, the field of Israeli violations of Palestinian
15/77/98, "Five Years After Oslo, Durable Peace Must be Based on Justice" (9 September
1998), on-line: Amnesty International <http://www.amnesty.org//news/l 998/5 l 507798.htm>
(date accessed: 19 October 1998).
92
LAW, "Five Years Since Oslo: A Summary of Human Rights Violations Since the
Declaration of Principles" (September 1998), on-line: LAW: The Palestinian Society for the
Protection of Human Rights and the Environment <http://www.lawsociety.org/reports/l 998/
oslo5 .html> (last modified: 7 October 1998).
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human rights is a topic too broad for the scope of this research paper.
The ensuing analysis is only intended to offer an examination of a
portion of those violations in order to illustrate the practical effect that
Zionism and Zionist-inspired laws have had on the Palestinian people.
1. The Right to Return

The right to return to one's home or country ("repatriation") is one of the
most "universally accepted" nonns in international human rights law. It
finds its Western roots in the Magna Carta of 1215. 93 This right has been
enshrined in numerous human rights documents and applies equally to
situations of peace-time, armed conflict, and belligerent occupation.
Article 13(2) of the UDHR states that "[ e]veryone has the right to ...
return to his country." 94 Likewise, Article 12(4) of the ICCPR provides
that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own
country." 95 The right to return is also enshrined in Article 12(2) of the
African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights, 96 Article 22(5) of the
American Convention on Human Rights, 97 and in numerous articles of
the Fourth Geneva Convention. 98
As noted above, immediately following the 1948 Arab-Israeli war,
the UN General Assembly passed resolution 194 (III), which called on
Israel to repatriate all Palestine refugees wishing to return to their
homes, and to compensate them whether or not repatriation was
effectuated. 99 In response, the Israeli government refused to allow any
but a minute number of the refugees back, refused to compensate them
for their prope1iies lost, and, to add insult to injury, passed The Law of
Return (1950), 100 A1iicle 1 of which stipulated that "[e]ve1y Jew has the
right to immigrate to this country."
In part, Chapter 42 of the Magna Carta provided that: "It shall be lawful in the future for
anyone ... to leave our kingdom and to return, safe and secure .... "Magna Carta, as quoted in
W.T. Mallison and S.V. Mallison, The Palestine Problem in lnter11atio11a/ Law and World
Order (Essex: Longman, I 986) at I 74.
94
GA Res. 2 I 7 A (III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, at 71, UN Doc. A/810 ( 1948).
95
(1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
96 26 June 1981, 21 I.L.M. 59 [hereinafter 4/i"ican Charter] (entered into force 21 October
198 I).
97
22 November 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673 [hereinafter American Co11ve11tion] (entered into force
18 July 1978).
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For instance, see 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, Arts. 6, 36, 45(2), 134, 158.
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The net effect of the Law ofReturn (19 5 0) and oflsrael' s refusal to
repatriate or to compensate the Palestine refugees of 1948 is that every
Jew in the world, irrespective of his or her historical connection to the
country, may immigrate to the state oflsrael and automatically receive
citizenship upon arrival. Conversely, the roughly 3.4 million Palestinian
refugees (descendants included) of the 1948 war, a people indigenous to
that country, are denied that same right. Therefore, "the right of 'return'
of non-residents (i.e. Jews), supersedes the repatriation of ex-residents
(Palestinian Arabs)," 101 and "the attribute of 'being Jewish' [is elevated]
to the status of a legally determining principle of exclusion from ... the
constituency of actual or potential citizens of the state oflsrael." 102
In this manner, Israel has been in flagrant violation of the
Palestinian peoples' right to return as enshrined in Article 13(2) of the
UDHR and in UN Resolution 194 for the past fifty years. This course
has undoubtedly been pursued for the iniquitous purpose of maintaining
Israel's "Jewish character" through the simultaneous fulfillment of the
Zionist goals of the "ingathering of the exiles" and the "transfer" of the
non-Jewish indigenous population. In the words of Israeli professor Uri
Davis, "the continued existence of the state of Israel as a Jewish state
must necessarily entail the continued exclusion of the 1948 Palestinian
Arab refugees from all and any parts of their homeland. If all 1948
refugees are allowed to return ... there can be no Jewish state." 103
A very important point about the Law of Return (1950), is that it
serves as the dubious foundation of a multitude of other pieces oflsraeli
legislation that also discriminate between "Jewish" and "non-Jewish"
(i.e. Palestinian) individuals. The only difference between those other
laws and the Law ofReturn (1950), however, is that they carefully avoid
the explicit use of the terms "Jew" and "non-Jew" as legal determinants.
Instead, they cloak their discrimination in the more insidious and
euphemistic expressions "anyone who can immigrate in accordance
with the Law of Return" (i.e. Jew) and "anyone who cannot immigrate
in accordance with the Law of Return" (i.e. non-Jew, more specifically
Palestinian Arab ). 104 According to Israel Shahak, this is done "in order

101
M. Soysal, "Israeli Law in the Light of the General Principles of Human Rights" in
Kochler, supra note 17 at 234.
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Davis, supra note 23 at 9.
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104
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to avoid embarrassment" and to maintain a sheepish facade of legal
equality that in reality simply does not exist. 105
2. The Right to Nationality
Although the right to nationality is not as time-honoured as the right to
return, the international community has regarded it as just as
fundamental a human right. Article 15(1) of the UDHR declares that
"[ e]veryone has the right to a nationality," and Article 15(2) stipulates
that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality." 106 The
right to nationality is also affirmed in many other international
instruments including Article 1 of the Convention on the Nationality of
Married Women, 107 and Article 20 of the American Convention. 108
With the rights of Palestinians to Israeli nationality effectively
balTed by the "Jews-only" effect of the Law of Return (1950), the only
alternative method by which they can regain nationality rights in their
homeland is through the "residence provisions" of the Israeli
Nationality Law (1952). 109 Article 3 of that law stipulates that automatic
citizenship for non-Jews (i.e. Palestinians) is only to be granted to those
who can establish proof of continuous residence in Israel from May 14,
1948 (day of declaration of Israeli independence) to July 14, 1952 (day
of coming into force of Nationality Law), or to those who can establish
that they legally returned to the country within that period and were
registered as an inhabitant by March 1, 1952.
As already shown, the vast majority of Palestine Arabs were either
expelled or fled from what became the state of Israel during the war of
1948. As such, they were automatically disqualified from acquiring
Israeli nationality under the Nationality Law (1952) by virtue of the fact
that they could not establish proof of continuous residence in the
country during the aforesaid time period. By the same token, of the
140,000 Palestinians who remained inside the state ofisrael, thousands
were unable to establish proof of continuous residence, and were
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therefore also denied nationality. 11 ° Furthermore, Israel's refusal to
allow any Palestinian refugees to return to the country as a matter of
official policy, 111 rendered the prospect of any sizable number of
refugees acquiring Israeli nationality by establishing proof of "legal"
return to, and subsequent registration in the country, next to impossible.
Like the Law ofReturn (1950), the Nationality Law (1952) finds its
raison d'etre in the twin Zionist goals of the "ingathering of the exiles"
and the "transfer" of the indigenous Palestinian population. As
acknowledged by Professor Hofnung, the law was designed to achieve
"two main parallel purposes": to enable Jews to acquire immediate
citizenship in the simplest way possible, and to make it more difficult
for former British Mandate non-Jewish residents [i.e. Palestinians] to
gain such citizenship. 112 Through the Nationality Law (1952), therefore,
Israel has maintained its "Jewish character," but only by being in direct
contravention of Articles 15(1) and (2) of the UDHR since 1948.
3. The Right to Ownership and Protection of Property
Article 17(1) of the UDHR states that "[e]veryone has the right to own
prope1iy," and Article 17(2) provides that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his property." 113 The right to ownership and protection of
property is also enshrined in Article 21 of the American Convention, 114
Aiiicle 1 of Protocol No. I to the European Convention for the
Protection ofHuman Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 115 and Article
14 of the African Charter. 116
As noted above, the Zionist notion of "conquest of the land" was
the single most important prerequisite to the creation of the Jewish state.
In the years immediately following the establishment of the state, over
According to Uri Davis, roughly five percent of the Palestinian population ofisrael fell
into this category, and were therefore officially classed as "stateless" persons living in Israel.
In an absurdity that spoke volumes about the legal position of Palestinians in Israel, this
"statelessness" was transferred to many Palestinian individuals born in Israel to "stateless"
Arab parents, until the government passed the Fourth Amendment to the Nationality Law in
1980 which effectively declared these individuals citizens of the state. Supra note 23 at 37.
111
Hofnung, supra note 50 at 77.
112
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"a dozen different Israeli laws [were] enacted specifically in order to
expropriate the largest possible area of Arab land" in the countiy. 117 It is
important to note that the bulk of this legislation was produced as part of
the Defence (Emergency) Regulations (1945), which, by their very
nature, gave the Israeli government enormous powers of control over
Palestinian interests in the country. It is equally important to note that
prior to partition in 194 7, less than six percent of the land of Palestine
was vested in Jewish hands. 118
The most notorious of the laws that stripped Palestinians of their
property rights was the Emergency Regulations (Absentees' Property)
Law (1948), which later became the Absentee Property Law (1950). 119
Pursuant to section 1 of this law, any person who, "on or after 29
November 1947 (the date of the Partition Resolution) [was] a citizen or
subject of any of the Arab states; in any of these states for any length of
time; in any part of Palestine outside of the Israeli-occupied area; or in
any place other than his habitual residence, even if such place ... [was]
within Israeli-occupied territory," automatically became an
"absentee." 120 Absentee property would then revert to the state via the
Custodian of Absentee Property. 121 As such, every one of the
approximately 700,000 Palestinian civilians who were expelled or
driven from the country during the war, as well as thousands of
internally displaced persons, were declared "absentees," and pursuant to
this law, their property (both movable and immovable) was confiscated
by state authorities. In this manner, billions of dollars worth of
Palestinian property was arbitrarily seized by Israel in order to help it
117
For instance, see the Emergency Regulations (Security Zones) (Extension of Validity)
(No. 2) Law (1949), 3 LS.I. 56 (1949); the Emergency Regulations (Cultivation of Waste
lands) (Extension of Validity) Ordinance (No. 36) (1949), 2 LS.I. 70 (1948-49); and the Land
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with very wide powers. The most drastic provision [of the Absentee Property Law (1950)] was
section 30 of the law, which transferred the burden of proof in litigation. The fact that a person
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lay the foundation for its exclusively Jewish state. 122 As Professor
Hofnung notes:
Once the property legislation became permanent, it served as a central
vehicle for transfeITing land from private [Arab] ownership ... to
public ownership (under Jewish control), and for creating favourable
conditions for the mass settlement of Jews in every part of the country
. . . . The heavy flow of Jews into Israel in its first years of
establishment, was eased, inter alia, by the control, expropriation and
allocation of the property of uprooted Arabs. Control of property was
gained by means of creating certain physical facts, and by way oflegal
proceedings aimed at divesting those who possessed land [i.e. Arabs]
of their ownership of it. The political aim of the [Absentee Property
Law (1950)] was to create a legal mechanism which would facilitate
the exploitation of the abandoned prope1ty for national purposes-in
other words, for Jewish settlement. 123

Israeli land confiscation did not stop with the property of the socalled "absentees," however. By way of the Emergency Regulations
(Cultivation of Waste lands) (Extension of Validity) Ordinance
(1949), 124 the Israeli government created a "legal" apparatus that
allowed it to expropriate vast tracts of remaining lands held by its own
Arab citizens. 125 Pursuant to this law, the Israeli Minister of Agriculture
122 The value of this property (movable and immovable) has been calculated to be worth
approximately US$ 92 billion, in 1984 prices. When one factors in the cost of lost income
opportunities and psychological damages incurred by the Palestine refugees since 1948, that
figure increases to approximately US$ 147 billion. Hadawi, supra note 43 at 183.
123
Supra note 50 at 103-4. Professor Hofnung continued:
By means of this law, the Custodian became the holder of legal rights in
almost every Arab town or village. When ownership was held jointly by a
number of people, some of whom were absentees, the Custodian claimed
his proportionate share of the land. Similarly, when the owner ofland died
without leaving a will and some of the heirs were classified as absentees
under the Law, the Custodian was entitled to the portion of all absentee
heirs. The Custodian even had rights in the property of the Muslim Waqf
[communal trust] when the person in charge of the land (who is appointed
by the Waqf), was an absentee. This was in spite of the fact that according
to the Sha'riah [sic] (Islamic) law, ownership of such property is vested in
God. Supra note 50 at I 06-7.
124
!ton Rish mi 1949 (Israeli Official Gazette during the Provisional Council of State) at 94.
125 According to Israeli professor Oren Yiftachel, "about two-thirds of the land belonging to
Palestinians who remained [inside Israel] as Israeli citizens was expropriated." See
"Democracy or Ethnocracy? Territory and Settler Politics in Israel/Palestine" (1998) 28:2
MERIP 9.
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was empowered to arbitrarily seize land that had become "waste land"
by virtue of it being "abandoned" or "un-cultivated." The Minister
would then tum it over to the state "to have it cultivated for the public
[i.e. Jewish] good." 126 This mechanism usually operated in the following
manner: under Regulation 125 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations
(1945), the local military commander would declare a specific tract of
land a "closed military area" for a certain period of time. That tract of
land would then become off-limits to all Palestinians, including the
owner. This invariably resulted in his or her inability to continue
cultivating it. Prior to the termination of the military closure, the
Minister of Agriculture would seize the land in question as "waste land"
because it had ceased to be cultivated by its owner. The land would then
be transfeITed to the state for the purpose of Jewish settlement. 127
Presently, over ninety-two percent of land in the state of Israel is
"held in perpetual trust for the Jewish people" 128 by extra-governmental
Zionist organizations, like the Jewish National Fund (JNF) 129 and the
Jewish Agency. 130 Article 3 of the Constitution of the Jewish Agency
provides that:
(d) Land is to be acquired as Jewish property and subject to the
provisions of Article 10 of this Agreement, the title to the lands
acquired is to be taken in the name of the Jewish National Fund,
to the end that the same shall be held as the inalienable property
of the Jewish people. [emphasis added] 131

Practically all of this land was expropriated from Palestinian owners by
use of the "legal" measures outlined above. 132 By virtue of the lease
126
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This was a fact admitted to in 1969 by Moshe Dayan (former Israeli Minister of Defence,
Foreign Minister and the country's most famous military hero) who stated that:
Jewish villages were built in the place of Arab villages. You even do not
know the names of these Arab villages, and I do not blame you because the
geography books [which listed them] no longer exist; not only do the
books not exist, the Arab villages are not there either. Nahlal [Dayan's
own settlement] arose in the place ofMahlul; Kibbutz Gevat in the place of
Jibta; Kibbutz Sarid in the place of Huneifis; and Kefar Yelrnshu'a in the
place ofTal al-Shuman. There is not one single place built in this coz111t1y
127
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provisions of the JNF, that land can never be owned or leased by nonJews. Article 23 of those provisions reads, in part, as follows:
[T]he lessee undertakes [that] ... the holding shall never be held by
any but a Jew. If the holder, being a Jew, leaves as his heir a non-Jew,
the Fund shall obtain the right of restitution. Prior to the enforcement
of the right of restitution, the Fund must give the heir three months
notice, within which period the heir shall transfer his rights to a Jew,
otherwise the Fund may enforce the right of restitution and the heir
may not oppose such enforcement. [emphasis added] 133

Interestingly enough, only a fraction of Israel's Jewish population
openly acknowledges the inherent racism and irony of these
provisions. 134 One such individual is Alexander Kedar, a property law
specialist at Haifa University, who has said: "I think that if a Jew
somewhere else in the world was prohibited from buying ... public land
owned by the federal government because they're Jews, I believe there
would have been an outcry in Israel." 135 Recently, in Ka 'adan v. Israel
Land Authority et al., these lease provisions were challenged on the
grounds of being discriminatory against Israeli Arabs. In an obvious
attempt to evade the issue, the Israeli High Court resolved to defer
proceedings and "urged both sides to find a personal housing solution
for the appellant." 136
Confiscation of Palestinian land in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
has been a marked feature of Israel's illegal occupation of those
that did not have a former Arab population [emphasis added]. M. Dayan,
"My Standing in the Labour Party," (lecture to the Israel Institute of
Technology, Ha 'aretz, 4 April 1969) as quoted in Masalha, Expulsion of
the Palestinians, supra note 4 at 90.
133 Hadawi, supra note 43 at 61-62.
134
See Shahak, Jewish Hist01y, Jewish Religion, supra note 82 at 1ff.
135
Said, supra note 3 at 20-21. Confiscation of Palestinian land in Israel has continued to
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"Judaization" schemes in the Galilee have been well documented. See HaNitzotz, '"Land
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territories since 1967. By way of its unilateral extension of the Defence
(Emergency) Regulations (1945) to the Occupied Territories, Israel has
legislated a multitude of military orders, similar in effect to the laws
outlined above, that have enabled it to expropriate hundreds of
thousands of dunums of Palestinian land. Those orders include: Military
Order No. 59, 137 which permits Israeli authorities to unilaterally declare
"non-registered" property to be "state land," thereby transferring it to
government (i.e. Jewish) ownership; Military Order No. 58, 138 which
allows Israeli authorities to confiscate lands that have been
"abandoned" by their owners; Military Order No. S/1/96, 139 which is
part of a series of orders that allow the Israeli authorities to declare an
area "closed," thereby permitting the government to requisition it for
exclusive Jewish use; 140 and Military Order No. T/27/96, 141 which is also
a part of a series of orders that allow Israeli authorities to expropriate
land for "public purposes," such as the construction of settlement bypass
roads. 142

Military Order No. 59, Order Concerning Government Properties (31 July 1967).
According to Palestinian lawyer, Raja Shehadeh, "[i]t is by virtue of Order 59 that hundreds of
thousands of dunums [form of Palestinian square measurement]-which constitute the
majority ofland used for [Jewish] settlement-have been declared "state" land and transferred
to the Jewish settlers." Supra note 80 at 27.
138
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absentee." Ibid. at 35.
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UN ESCOR, 52d Sess., UN Doc. A/52/172/E/1997/71 (1997) at para. 15 [hereinafter
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than 170,000 dunums of Palestinian land.
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Through the laws and processes outlined above, the state of Israel
has been extremely successful in its fifty-year campaign to "Judaize"
what used to be Arab Palestine. In the process of this carefully
orchestrated conquest, Palestinian rights to ownership and protection of
their property, as enshrined in Article 17 of the UDHR, have been
systematically denied. What is more, is that through these hostile acts
Israel has directly violated numerous provisions of the Fourth Geneva
Convention, specifically Article 53, which prohibits the destruction of
the real or personal property of protected persons by the Occupying
Power, and Article 49, which prohibits the transfer of civilian nationals
of the Occupying Power into the territory it occupies.
4. The Right to Work
Article 23 (1) of the UDHR provides that "[ e]veryone has the right to
work, [and] to free choice of employment," and Article 23(2) states that
"[ e]veryone ... has the right to equal pay for equal work." 143 Article 6(1)
of the ICESCR requires that all States Parties "recognize the right to
work, which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his
living by work which he freely chooses." 144 The right to work, and to
free choice of work, is also recognized in Article 14 of the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties ofMan, 145 in Part I, Article 1 of the
European Social Charter, 146 and in Article 15 of the African Charter. 147
As noted above, over ninety-two percent of the land of present-day
Israel is considered by its government to be the inalienable property of
the Jewish people, and is therefore prohibited from being owned or
leased by any non-Jew, and more specifically, by any Palestinian.
Consistent with this "Jews-only" policy, no Palestinian is permitted to
work on that land either. This is based on Article 3(e) of the Constitution
of the Jewish Agency that provides that the Agency "shall promote
agricultural colonization based on Jewish labour, and in all works or
undertakings carried out or furthered by the Agency, it shall be deemed
to be a matter of principle that Jewish labour shall be employed."
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[emphasis added] 148 In order to enforce this prohibition, INF lease
provisions impose punitive measures on any Jewish lessee who employs
Palestinian labour. Article 23 of those provisions reads, in part, as
follows:
The lessee undertakes to execute all works connected with the
cultivation of the holding only with Jewish labour. Failure to comply
with this duty by the employment of non-Jewish labour shall render
the lessee liable to the payment of a compensation ... for each default.
The fact of the employment of non-Jewish labour shall constitute
adequate proof as to the damages and the amount thereof, and the
right of the Fund to be paid the compensation refen-ed to, and it shall
not be necessary to serve on the lessee any notarial or other notice.
Where the lessee has contravened the provisions of this Article three
times, the Fund may apply the right of restitution of the holding
without paying any compensation whatever. [emphasis added] 149

The dispossession of the majority of the Palestinian land-owning
class in 1948, and the expropriation of lands belonging to Palestinians
who remained in Israel in the years immediately following its
establishment, gave rise to the formation of a huge labour pool of
landless Palestinians in the country. 150 With ideological and legal
prohibitions against their employment in the public sector, these
workers rapidly became absorbed into the lower echelons of the
construction and service sectors. 151 Between 1948 and 1966, "[m]ilitary
authorities used the pass system to control the flow of [Arab] labour into
the Jewish economy," and "[i]n periods of unemployment in the Jewish
economy the authorities withheld permits to protect Jewish jobs." 152
Until 1960, Palestinian citizens of Israel were prohibited from
membership in the Histadrut-the country's main trade union and
second largest employer. 153 It was not until 1966 that they were
permitted to participate in Histadrut national elections. 154 Attempts to
form an Arab trade union in the 1950s had been met with hostility by the
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government who arrested the leaders and disbanded the organization. 155
Since the 1960 decision to drop its prohibition on Israeli-Arab
membership, Jewish leaders of the Histadrut have worked hard to keep
Arab influence in the organization to a minimum. Not surprisingly then,
" [o] f 600 managers operating Histadrut firms, none to date [has been]
an Arab." 156
The Israeli conquest of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967,
"offered opportunities for exploitation [of Palestinian labour] on a
relatively massive scale." 157 It was at that time that the exclusively
"Jewish labour" concept in Israel "gave way to the norm that Arabs
were especially suited to the performance of menial tasks." 158 Like their
compatriots living in Israel, Palestinian residents of the Occupied
Territories were increasingly forced to turn to "day labour jobs" as a
consequence of Israel's rapid expropriation of their lands. As a result,
"by the 1980s one-third of the [West Bank and Gaza Strip] work force
commuted to jobs inside" Israel. 159 Today, that number has been
reduced to less than seven percent of the total labour force, 160 primarily
because of the comprehensive closures Israel has imposed on the
Territories since the Intifadah, 161 and the increased reliance Israel has
placed on cheap migrant labour from south and south-east Asia.
Nevertheless, this has not been accompanied by a corresponding
reduction in the level of discrimination Palestinian workers in Israel
have had to face. For instance, Israeli law makes it illegal for Palestinian
workers to remain in the country over night. 162 Further, the denial of
equal pay for equal work is tacitly condoned by the state, since
Palestinian workers tend to get paid twenty to thirty percent less than
Israelis for the same work. 163 In addition, the Histadrut deducts a
percentage of Palestinian workers' salaries, but refuses to allow them to
Ibid. at 114.
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become members or issue any benefits to them. 164 Palestinian workers
"are assessed wage deductions to the same extent as resident workers,"
but do not receive the subsequent social benefits that normally attach to
those deductions-a phenomenon denounced by Israeli professor of
sociology, Michael Shwartz, as an "apartheid practice." 165 Although
many thought that the cunent Oslo Peace Process would bring an end to
these injustices, this has not been the case. Palestinian workers from the
West Bank and Gaza Strip continue to be subject to the same practices
listed above, and the economic effect of Israeli closures on the
Tenitories since 1995 has been devastating. 166
Inspired by Theodore Herzl's call to "spirit the penniless
population across the border" by "denying it any employment" in the
Jewish state, the government of Israel has continuously discriminated
against Palestinian workers, whether citizens of the state or not, since
1948. This policy has carefully been designed to operate as a sort of
"ec.onomic vice" on the Palestinians, the tightening of which is
intended, in part, to encourage the emigration from the country of as
many of them as possible, in a further effort to clear the land of its nonJ ewish presence. Consequently, the Palestinian right to work, to free
choice of work, and to equal pay for equal work as enshrined in A1iicles
23(1) and (2) of the UDHR and Article 6(1) of the ICCPR, have been
systematically violated for the purpose of, inter alia, keeping Bretz
Israel "Jewish."
5. The Right to Protection Against Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or
Exile
The right to protection against arbitrary alTest and detention is one of the
most fundamental principles of the rule of law. Likewise, the right to
protection against exile is firmly established in both international
human rights and international humanitarian law. A1iicle 9 of the UDHR
provides that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary anest, detention or
Ibid.
M. Shwartz, "The Apparatus Behind the Exploitation of the Workers from
Territories" in I. Shahak, Collection: The Treatment of the Palestinian Workers fi-0111
Occupied Territories Who Work in Israel, as quoted in Ibid. at 183.
166
For instance, in 1997 the Palestinian economy in the Occupied Territories
approximately US$ 228 million, and the unemployment rate was pushed to 30.1 %.
UNESCO Report, supra note 146.
164
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exile." 167 Similarly, Article 9(1) of the ICCPR states that "[n]o one shall
be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention." 168 This right is also
enshrined in Article 25 of the American Declaration, 169 in Article 5(2)
of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, 170 in Article 6 of the African Charter, 171 and in
numerous a1iicles of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 172
Since 1948, Israeli authorities have been vested with the power to
arrest and detain persons without charge or trial under Regulation 111 of
the Defence (Emergency) Regulations (1945) . 173 This process of arrest is
referred to as "administrative detention," and is cmTently exercised by
the Minister of Defence in Israel proper, as well as by local military
commanders in the Occupied Territories. 174 According to Amnesty
International, the "vast majority of administrative detainees are
Palestinian," 175 and to this day all Palestinians living under Israeli
jurisdictions, whether citizens oflsrael gr not, are legally subject to such
detention at the sole discretion of state military authorities. 176
In 1995, amendments to the Defence (Emergency) Regulations
(1945) increased the maximum length of an administrative detention
order from six months to one year. Under the original law all detention
orders can still "be extended indefinitely," 177 and"[ d]etention orders of
six months or less" may be "renewed without a judicial hearing." 178
Although the right to counsel and appeal exist with detention orders
GA Res. 217 A(III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, at71, UN Doc. A/810 (1948).
(1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
169
2 May 1948, 43 AJILs 133.
170
4 November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention] (entered into
force 3 September 1953).
171
26 June 1981, 21 I.L.M. 59.
172
For instance, see 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, Arts. 33, 43, 49, 71, and 72.
173
Hofnung, supra note 50 at 95.
174
Amnesty International, Administrative Detention: Despair, Uncertainty and Lack of
Due Process (Report MDE 15/03/97 Israel/Occupied Territories) (April 1997) at 1.
175
Ibid. at 2.
176
Hofnung, supra note 50 at 275-76. With the abolishment of the militaiy administration
that governed Israel's Palestinian citizens between 1948 and 1966, the use of administrative
detention against their communities gradually became less frequent. Although Israel's
Palestinian citizens are still legally subject to administrative detention, it has been the
Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip that have had to face the negative effects
ofisrael' s relatively heavy use of administrative detention in the post-1967 era.
177
Soysal, supra note 101 at 236.
178
Amnesty International, supra note 174 at 1.
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exceeding six months, "neither the lawyer nor the detainee is informed
of the details of the evidence against him" on grounds of "state
security." 179 As such, the detainee's ability to make full answer and
defense is virtually impossible. 180
Over the years, successive Israeli governments have insisted that
"[a]dministrative detention is resorted to only in cases where there is
corroborating evidence that an individual is engaged in illegal acts
which [involve] danger to state security." 181 Under this criteria,
hundreds of thousands of Palestinian civilians have been arrested and
detained without charge or trial since 1948. 182 Many of these individuals
have been "prisoners of conscience"-those held for the "non-violent
exercise of [their] right to freedom of expression and association." 183
According to Amnesty International, "[ d]uring the Palestinian uprising
(Intifadah) . . . the overall number of Palestinians who were
administratively detained was well over 5000. These included students,
labourers, human rights workers, journalists, trade unionists, and
teachers." 184 Today, five years after the signing of the DOP, 185 thousands
of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories continue to be held in
administrative detention-some of whom have been incarcerated for
"close to five years." 186
Regarding the issue of forced exile, since 1948 various provisions
of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations (1945) have been used to
deport thousands of Palestinian civilians from both Israel proper and the
Occupied Territories. 187 Mass deportations of groups of (non-citizen)
Palestinians in Israel were executed by the Israeli Army in the late 1940s
and early 1950s. 188 According to Professor Hofnung, there exists
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In fact, since August of 1996, Palestinian detainees in the Occupied Teuitories have
been boycotting military comi hearings to protest the unfairness of these procedures. Ibid.
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1998).
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"[ v]olumes of [Israeli] Supreme Court cases from the early 1950s [that]
are full of stories of Arabs who had been illegally deported from Israel
and had returned without permission, and whose requests to be
registered as residents or citizens were denied." 189
Israel's deportation of Palestinians was even more pronounced
after its conquest of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967. Since then,
in their effort to crush all opposition to the military occupation, Israeli
authorities have issued hundreds of deportation orders against
Palestinians who have been considered "security risks." These
deportees have included doctors, lawyers, professors, mayors, trade
unionists, student leaders, and many other similar individuals. Article
49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention expressly provides that
"[i]ndividual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of
protected persons from occupied territory ... are prohibited, regardless
of their motive." 190 Nevertheless, when Israel's deportation policy in the
West Bank was challenged in 1979 as being contrary to this provision,
the Israeli Supreme Court upheld the practice, ruling incorrectly that
Article 49 only prohibited "mass deportations for purposes of forced
labour or extermination,'' not "deportations of individuals or small
groups, done for punitive purposes." 191 To date, the Oslo Peace Process
has not put an end to Israel's use of deportation as a tool of repression,
and, like the threat of being placed in administrative detention for
indefinite periods of time, every Palestinian currently living in Israel or
the Occupied Territories may be subjected to arbitrary deportation
orders under the Defence (Emergency) Regulations (1945) if the
government deems it fit to issue such orders.
Aside from violating the various principles of international human
rights and humanitarian law quoted above, Israel's use of administrative
Ibid. at 81. On this score, Professor Hofnung cites the following cases: H.C. 125/51
Hassin and Others v. Minister of Interior, 5 P.D. 1386; H.C. 157/51 Abad v. Minister of
Interior, 5 P.D. 1680; H.C. 138/51 Ta 'ah v. Minister ofInterior, 7 P.D. 160; H.C. 236/51 Qis
and 34 Others v. Minister of Interior, 8 P.D. 617; H.C. 282/52 Abu Da 'ud v. Minister of
Interior, 7 P.D. 1081; and H.C. 155/53 Khewan v. Minister of Defence, 8 P.D. 301.
190 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
191 H.C. 97/79 Abu Awad v. IDF Commander ofJudea and Samaria, 33 P.D. 309 as cited in
Quigley, supra note 26 at 202. Notwithstanding this judgment, however, in December 1992
Israeli authorities deported 415 Palestinians-the vast majority of whom were doctors,
lawyers, professors, teachers, and university students-"all in a single day." See Hofnung,
supra note 50 at 263.
189
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detention and forced deportation of Palestinians cannot be divorced
from the basic principles of Zionism previously outlined. While forced
deportation directly achieves the goal of "Arab Transfer," the use of
administrative detention works to fragment Palestinian society by
relentlessly subjecting its constituents to sub-human treatment. Over
time, Palestinian opposition to Israel's domination and occupation
effectively erodes, and the latter can be left alone in its quest to
confiscate even more Palestinian land in order to convert it to exclusive
Jewish "ownership."
6. The Right to Protection Against Tortu.re, Cruel and Inhuman
Punishment
Both Article 5 of the UDHR, 192 and Article 7 of the ICCPR, 193 provide
that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment." Similarly, other express
prohibitions on the use of torture and inhuman treatment exist in Article
5(2) of the American Convention, 194 in Article 3 of the European
Convention, 195 in Article 5 of the African Charter, 196 and in numerous
articles of both the Fourth Geneva Convention 197 and the UN
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment. 198
Although it is doubtful that Palestinian citizens of Israel who were
detained as "security threats" in Israeli prisons between 1948 and 1966
would not have been subjected to some fonn of cruel or inhuman
treatment, the lack of independent investigatory reports for that period
make it difficult to comment on the degree to which such measures were
employed by Israeli military authorities. This is not the case, however,
with respect to the torture and mistreatment of Palestinian detainees in
the TeITitories occupied by Israel after 1967.
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The two main Israeli interrogation agencies that operate in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip are the General Security Service (GSS)also commonly referred to as Shin Bet or Shabak-and the Israel
Defence Force (IDF). According to Human Rights Watch, these
agencies "use techniques that amount to torture-according to
internationally recognized definitions of the tenn 199-when trying to
pressure security suspects to give and sign statements, or to provide
information about third parties" that will be used as evidence, usually
against the detainee, in subsequent military court hearings. 200 Specific
techniques employed by the GSS and the IDF in their interrogations
include: beatings (with clubs, kicks or punches) to all areas of the body
including bottoms of feet, the torso, and genitals; 201 violent shaking,
which entails clutching the detainee by lapels and shaking him into
unconsciousness (usually combined with choking); 202 prolonged
abusive body positioning, which entails the "chaining, handcuffing,
shackling, confining or othe1wise constraining of detainees in painful
positions for hours or days;" 203 prolonged exposure to temperature
extremes, including the use of refrigerator units; 204 prolonged sleep,
space, and toilet deprivation; 205 and uttering of threats, usually of death,
rape of the detainee or female relatives. 206 On average, a total of 4,000 to
6,000 Palestinian detainees are subjected to these and other forms of
Article 1 of the UN Convention Against Torture, 10 December 1984, 24 I.L.M. 535, sets
out the internationally recognized definition of torture as follows:
1. For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act
by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from
him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an
act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from,
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
200
Human Rights Watch, supra note 82 at 1.
201
Ibid. at l 87ff.
202
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torture and inhuman treatment each year. 207 Since 1967, many have died
during, or as a result of, the use of such interrogation methods. 208
Although numerous regimes engage in the use of torture with the
tacit approval of government authorities, Israel is the only country in the
world that openly and legally endorses the use of what it calls "moderate
physical pressure" on its Palestinian detainees, 209 the vast majority of
whom are political prisoners held without charge or trial.2 10 In 1987, a
government commission expressly proposed the use and codification of
such measures, 211 and in a string of 1996 Israeli High Court cases, the
use of "physical force," "violent shaking," "sleep deprivation," and
other methods of torture were given blanket judicial approval. 212
Again, although it is clear that the state oflsrael has systematically
violated, and continues to violate, international legal prohibitions on the
use of torture with respect to its treatment of Palestinian detainees, these
violations cannot be viewed as existing outside of the larger ideological
framework of Zionism. Like the prolonged subjection to the toils of
administrative detention or economic exclusion/exploitation, the wideIbid. at x.
For example: Mustafa 'Akawi (d. 4 February 1992; 35 yrs.; stated cause of death, heart
failure); Ayman Sa'id Nassar (d. 2 April 1993; 22 yrs.; stated cause of death, lung failure);
Mustafa Barakat (d. 4 August 1992; 23 yrs.; stated cause of death, bronchial asthma attack);
Hazem 'Eid (d. 8 July 1992; 23 yrs.; stated cause of death, "suicide by hanging"). Ibid. at
264ff. See also J.R. Hiltermann, "Deaths in Israeli Prisons" (1990) 19:3 J. of Palestine Studies
101, who surveys the death of ninteen Palestinian detainees in Israeli prisons for the period
1988-1990. The stated cause of those deaths break-down as follows: six by "suicide"; four by
beatings; four by gunshot wounds; three by "illness"; one by denial of medical treatment; and
one by dehydration following a hunger strike.
209
Government of Israel, Commission of Inquily into the Methods of Investigation of the
General Security Service Regarding Hostile Terrorist Activities (Landau Commission Report,
1987), para. 4.7 as quoted in Human Rights Watch, supra note 82 at 50.
210
Amnesty International, supra note 174 at 2. See also Ibid. at 30.
211
Amnesty International, supra note 174 at 2.
212
In each of these cases the comi invoked the "defence of necessity" to justify its sanction
of the use of torture on Palestinian detainees. Specifically, these rulings were guided by the
Israeli government's contention, concurred with by the court, that the procurement of
information from Palestinian detainees which could "prevent serious terrorist attacks" took
legal precedence over the detainees' right to bodily integrity and security of the person.
Interestingly, however, at no point in any of the judgments did the court speak to the inherent
unreliability of information procured through the use of torture methods. See B'Tselem,
Legitimizi11g Torture: The Israeli High Court of Justice Rulings in the Bilbeisi, Hamda11 and
Mubarak Cases (B'Tselem-The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the
Occupied Ten-itories: January 1997).
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spread use of torture against Palestinian civilians is not only designed to
fragment their national liberation struggle, but is also aimed at
perpetuating a general sense of societal despair and political impotence.
Moreover, the use of torture on Palestinians is intended to illustrate the
low premium the government of Israel places on their lives. Further it is
demonstrative of the conviction of some Israeli people that-as
articulated here by Zionist writer Moshe Smilansky-iflife doesn't suit
Palestinians living under Jewish rule, "they can go back to the Arab
countries" (i.e. leave Palestine). 213
7. The Right to Freedom of Expression and Opinion
Article 19 of the UDHR provides that "[ e]veryone has the right to
freedom of opinion and expression."214 Likewise, A1iicle 19(1) of the
ICCPR states that "[e]veryone shall have the right to hold opinions
without interference," and Article 19(2) makes clear that "[ e]veryone
shall have the right to freedom of expression."215 The right to freedom of
expression and opinion is also affirmed in Article 4 of the American
Declaration, 216 Article 10(1) of the European Convention, 217 and Article
9 of the African Charter. 218
Although the Israeli Supreme Court has declared freedom of
expression to be a "supreme right," 219 the Israeli government has
flagrantly violated this right in so far as it pertains to Palestinians living
under its jurisdictions. Israeli power to exercise censorship over
Palestinians derives, once again, from the Defence {Emergency)
Regulations (1945). The regulations contain a series of provisions that
allow the State Censor to prohibit the publication or dissemination of
any material that, in its opinion, would compromise the "security" of the
Jewish state. Because "state security" is a vague term, 220 virtually
213
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In a discussion of the powers of the Israeli Military Censor in the Occupied Territories,
Professor Hofnung makes the following revealing comments: "When military censorship
began to be applied [after 1967], there were no clear guidelines on how it was to operate.
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anything "considered undesirable by the [Israeli] authorities" may be
censored. 221 This is exemplified by Article 94 of Section 8 of the
regulations, which governs the issuance of publishing permits for
various forms of print media. This regulation prohibits the publication
or dissemination of any information without the express permission of
the District Commissioner who, "in his discretion and without assigning
any reason therefore, may grant or refuse any such permit and may
attach conditions thereto and at any time suspend or revoke any such
permit or vary or delete any conditions attached to the permit or attach
new conditions thereto." 222 Likewise, the Military Censor operating in
the Occupied TeITitories is vested with "absolute discretion ... to ban the
publication of any information which, 'in his opinion,' is likely to hann
'state defence, public peace or public order. '"223 Since 1967, this power
has been "strictly applied" to silence Palestinian opposition to the
military occupation. 224
The most notorious of Israel's censorship laws is the Prevention of
Terrorism Ordinance (1980), which imposes a three-year prison
sentence on anyone who:
carries out an act that expresses solidarity or sympathy with a terrorist
organization by raising a flag, exhibiting a badge or slogan, singing a
song or drant or performing any other similar public act which clearly
demonstrates such solidarity or sympathy in a public place or in a
manner whereby people present in a public place can see or hear such
expression of solidarity or sympathy. 225

Arrangements took form over the years through a process of trial and eJTor, crises and ad hoc
solutions. Avner Bar-On who was the Chief Censor for twenty-six years, tells a revealing story
in this connection. When Bar-On took over the position of Chief Censor, he asked the Chief of
Staff, General Yigal Yadin, what the tenn 'harm to state security' meant. Yadin, with an irked
expression on his face, replied impatiently, 'There is the censor whom you are supposed to
replace; talk to him.' Bar-On spoke to the outgoing censor, Gershon Dror, and tried to extract
a definition of the term 'harm to state security' from him. Dror's answer was: 'It is impossible
to define it. After you have been seated here for some time, you know what is harm to state
security and what is not"' [emphasis added]. Hofnung, supra note 50 at 134.
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Originally promulgated in order to silence Palestinian expressions of
nationalism and solidarity with the PLO, since the signing of the DOP it
has been used to gag support of the so-called Palestinian "opposition
groups." 226 In any case, it illustrates the extent to which Israeli law is
prepared to go in order to maintain exclusive Jewish sovereignty over
even the realm of public expression and opinion.
8. The Right to Education
Article 26 of the UDHR provides that "[ e]veryone has the right to
education." 227 Similarly, Article 13(1) of the ICESCR requires that all
"States Parties ... recognize the right of education."228 The right to
education can also be found in Article 12 of the American
Declaration, 229 and Article 17 of the African Convention. 230
Consistent with the basic fundamentals of Zionism, the State
Education Law (No. 50) (1953) 231 stipulates that the purpose of
elementary education in Israel must be to instill "the values of Jewish
culture" and "loyalty to the State and the Jewish people." Because this
"purpose" also legally applies to "non-Jewish educational institutions"
(i.e. private Palestinian Christian and Muslim schools), Palestinian
history and culture is strictly prohibited from being taught to Palestinian
children in Israel. In order to ensure compliance with this law, curricula
in Palestinian schools are formulated and strictly monitored by the state.
This discriminatory policy is compounded by the fact that while the
government subsidizes religious Jewish education, it denies funding to
Palestinian Christian and Muslim religious education. 232
University education in Israel is also blatantly discriminatory
towards Palestinians. For instance, Israeli universities have a policy of
refusing Arab applicants to ce1iain faculties on grounds of "security."233
226
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Moreover, Palestinian students are prohibited from the benefits of
numerous government scholarships, loans, and grants simply because
they are not Jewish. 234 For example, certain Jewish Agency scholarships
make it clear that only those students who can immigrate to Israel "in
accordance with the Law of Return" (i.e. Jews) shall be eligible. 235
Likewise, various other state scholarships stipulate that only those who
have served in the Israeli A1my (i.e. Jews) may qualify. 236 As previously
noted, despite the attempt by the government to conceal the
discriminatory effect of these scholarship conditions by using
convoluted euphemisms for the requirement of being a "Jew," anyone
with a general knowledge of Zionism and the exclusive nature of the
state of Israel would have no problem identifying this fact, least of all
the Palestinian citizens of the state. 237
While Palestinian education in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is
more independent than Palestinian education in Israel insofar as its
ability to formulate curricula for its students, 238 it has had to face far
more persecution from the Israeli military authorities as a result.
According to Palestinian lawyer Raja Shehadeh, "[s]tudents in the West
Bank are probably subjected more than any other group to constant acts
of harassment by the [military] authorities." 239 Since 1967, this
harassment has manifested itself in, inter alia, mass student arrests,
indefinite school closures, imprisonment, and deportation of students,
teachers, and professors. 240 Military Order No. 854, 241 for instance:
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National Minority (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980) at 21-23.
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major universities in the Territories may only do so with a pen11it issued by the Military
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empowers the military authorities to exercise complete control over
whomever may be accepted by the university as a student, teacher or
principal. It requires all students who do not hold identity cards issued
by the Area Commander of the West Bank to obtain a permit [similar
to a South African "Pass Card"] from the Area Commander before
they can enroll as students. It also gives the [military] authorities
powers over licensing teachers, both foreign and local. 242

The desperate lengths to which Israel will go to continue its longheld policy of suppressing Palestinian education in the Occupied
Territories were highlighted during the Intifadah. In December of 1987,
again under the pretext of "state security," Israeli military authorities
closed all 1, 194 West Bank schools (elementary to university level)
indefinitely. 243 As a result, Palestinian education was forced
"underground," and classes were conducted clandestinely in private
homes and at other hidden locales. Military orders were passed that
made it a punishable offence to patiake in such lessons, and the Israeli
Army conducted regular raids on private homes in order to enforce these
orders. School children began to "cany their books and pencils hidden
in plastic bags of bread, not in school bags, so the soldiers would not
follow them," 244 and university students were routinely arrested for
partaking in "closet" lectures conducted to keep their degree programs
on their normal tracks. 245 Although underground education ceased in
1993 with the end of the Intifadah, Israeli policies of suppressing
Palestinian education in the Territories were not altogether abandoned.
Five years after the signing of the DOP, mass student arrests and
arbitra1y school closures continue, and Military Order No. 854 still
operates to deny thousands of Palestinians (especially those from the
Gaza Strip enrolled in programs in West Bank universities) the right to
education. This current reality was underscored by the mass arrest of
280 Palestinian students from Birzeit University-one-tenth of the
student body-just before dawn on March 28, 1996. Needless to say,
none of the students were given reasons for their arrest. 246
242
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Like each of the human rights violations analyzed above, Israel's
systematic violation of the Palestinian right to education as enshrined in
Article 26 of the UDHR and Article 13(1) of the ICESCR cannot be
viewed in isolation from the basic tenets of Zionism. According to
Jewish Professor Ian Lustick, Israeli discrimination in education has
"induced large numbers of young Arabs to leave the country"-a
testament to the efficacy of such discrimination in furthering the goal of
"Arab Transfer." But what is perhaps more important for us to recognize
on this score, is the extent of the measures Israel has taken in its effort to
prevent the growth of a young and independent Palestinian intellectual
base that is conscious of its surroundings and capable of challenging the
unjust status quo imposed on it by the Jewish state. Through this effort
to stifle the growth of Palestinian youth, one can see Zionism, and by
extension the state of Israel, for what it truly is-an outdated, archaic
colonial construct of the nineteenth century, whose continued survival
can only be maintained through its ability to subjugate every vestige of
the indigenous non-Jewish culture that thrived in Palestine before it
unilaterally declared it to be the exclusive homeland of the Jewish
people.

IV. ZIONISM, RACISM, AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

On November 10, 1975, the United Nations General Assembly passed
resolution 3379 (XXX) which proclaimed Zionism to be "a form of
racism and racial discrimination."247 In the resolution's preamble, the
General Assembly recalled its resolution 1904 (XVIII) of November 20,
1963, proclaiming the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 248 In particular, the Assembly
reiterated its affinnation that "any doctrine of racial differentiation or
superiority is scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust
and dangerous,'' and expressed its alarm at "the manifestations of racial
discrimination still in evidence in some areas in the world, some of
which are imposed by certain Governments by means of legislative,
247
GA Res. 3379 (XXX), UN GAOR, 30th Sess., UN Doc. A/RES/3379 (XXX) (1975)
[hereinafter Resolution 3379 (XXX)].
248
GA Res. 1904 (XVIII), UN GAOR, 18th Sess., UN Doc. A/5603 (1963).
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administrative or other measures." Through resolution 3379 (XXX), the
international community officially recognized the state of Israel as
being one of those governments that uses "legislative, administrative or
other measures" to impose doctrines of "racial differentiation and
superiority" on its indigenous population. Needless to say, the Jewish
state vehemently protested the passing of this resolution. 249
Israel was not alone in its protest. The United States, its long-time
sponsor, brazenly argued that "under the guise of a programme to
eliminate racism, the United Nations was officially endorsing antiSemitism" by passing resolution 3379 (XXX). 250 Each year thereafter,
Israel and the United States lobbied hard to have that resolution
revoked, and on December 16, 1991-immediately following the Gulf
War, and at the height of US influence in the UN-that is exactly what
happened by way of General Assembly resolution 46/86. 251
In introducing this unprecedented resolution before the General
Assembly, the United States' representative, Mr. Eagleburger, outlined
his government's position on it. Among other things, he stated that:
Resolution 3379 (XXX) was one of this body's most ungenerous acts.
It branded the national aspirations of one people [the Jews], and one
people only, as illegitimate-a people that had been homeless,
dispersed and exiled for the better part of two millennia. It labeled as
racist the national aspirations of one people more victimized by racism
than any other .... It told them that the international community in all
its solemn majesty had once again subjected the Jewish people to a
singular form of persecution. 252

Particularly disturbing about Mr. Eagleburger' s speech, is the fact that
at no time did he make mention of the Palestinian people, and more
importantly, of the racist effect that "the nationalist aspirations" of the
Jews (i.e. Zionism) have had on them. By treating the Palestinians as
though they did not exist, by invoking the familiar image of the Jews as
the consummate victims of racism (as if to suggest they could not be
capable of such deeds themselves), and by casting Zionism in an
H. Cattan, Palestine and lntemational Law, 2nd ed. (London: Longman, 1976) at 221.
"E!imination of Racial Discrimination" in Yearbook of the United Nations 1975 (New
York: UN Department of Public Information, 1975) at 592.
251 GA Res. 46/86, UN GAOR, 46th Sess., UN Doc. A/46/L.47 (1991).
252 Provisional Verbatim Record of the 74th Meeting of the General Assembly, UN GAOR,
46th Sess., 74th Mtg., UN Doc. A/46/PV.74 (1991) at 12, 14-15.
249
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historical, political, and cultural vacuum in which only Jews were
affected, the US representative adopted the classic formula employed by
the Zionist movement to justify its persecution of the indigenous nonJ ewish people in the Jewish state. Would any serious discussion of
Nazism or Apartheid be possible without addressing the racist effects
that those "nationalist" ideologies had on European Jews and Black
South Africans, respectively? Surely not. Yet this was the exact form of
"blind logic" that was used to revoke the General Assembly's 1975
determination of Zionism as a form of racism.
So long as the conditions that gave rise to the adoption of
resolution 3379 (XXX) persist-and this paper has shown that they still
do-the General Assembly's revocation of that resolution, aside from
marginalizing Zionism's victims even further, can only be characterized
as a serious affront to Article 1 of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 253 which defines
"racial discrimination" as:
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race,
colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or
effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or
exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field
of public life.

Indeed, if any philosophy conforms to this internationally accepted
definition of racial discrimination it must be Zionism. How else could a
colonial ideology founded on the "purity" of the Jewish "race" and bent
on establishing and maintaining an exclusively Jewish state in a country
already inhabited by non-Jews be classified? Fortunately, the issue of
whether the international community views Zionism as a form of racism
did not die with the revocation ofresolution 3379 (XXX).
In the Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of Women and Their
Contribution to Development and Peace, 254 the World Conference of the
International Women's Year ( 197 5) declared that "international cooperation and peace require ... the elimination of colonialism and neocolonialism, foreign occupation, zionism, apartheid and racial
7 March 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force 4 January 1969; ratified by Israel, 3
January 1979).
254
19 June 1975, UN Doc. E/5725, Part One, Sect. I.
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discrimination in all its forms" [emphasis added]. Similarly, in the
Political Declaration and Strategy to Strengthen International Peace
and Security and to Intensifj; Solidarity and Mutual Assistance Among
Non-Aligned Countries, 255 the Non-Aligned Movement "condemned
zionism as a threat to world peace and security and called upon all
countries to oppose this racist and imperialist ideology" (emphasis
added). Likewise, in resolution 77 (XII) of the Assembly of Heads of
State of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the OAU declared
"that the racist regime in occupied Palestine and the racist regimes in
Zimbabwe and South Africa have a common imperialist origin, fonning
a whole and having the same racist structure and being organically
linked in their policy aimed at repression of the dignity and integrity of
the human being" [emphasis added]. 256 Finally, in the preamble of the
African Charter, the OAU undertakes to "eliminate colonialism, neocolonialism, apartheid, zionism and . . . all forms of discrimination"
[emphasis added].257
In support of this international condemnation of Zionism, various
individuals from within the Jewish community, both inside and outside
Israel, have actually come forth to confirm that the ideology is indeed a
form of racism. For instance, Dr. Israel Shahak, one of the most
outspoken Israeli human rights activists, has proclaimed that:
The State of Israel is a racist state in the full meaning of this term: In
this state people are discriminated against, in the most permanent and
legal way and in the most important areas of life, only because of their
origin. This racist discrimination began with Zionism and is carried
out today mainly in co-operation with the institutions of the Zionist
movement. 258

Echoing these sentiments, Rabbi Elmer Berger, the renowned
American-Jewish human rights activist, has also described Zionism as
"racist" and "discriminatory" in nature. 259 In a statement particularly
relevant to the focus of this study, Berger once noted that:
28 July 1975, UN Doc. A/10297, Annex II.
25 August 197 5, UN Doc. A/l 0217 and Corr. 1, Annex, at 3.
25 7 26 June 1981, 21 I.L.M. 59.
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I. Shahak, "The Racist Nature of Zionism and of the Zionist State oflsrael" Pi-Ha 'a ton
(5 November 1975) as quoted in Zayid, supra note 82 at 60.
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E. Berger, Memoirs of an Anti-Zionist Jew (Washington DC: Institute for Palestine
Studies, 1978) at 57.
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By definition, Zionism is incapable of legislating human rights for
itself. Nor can it grant human rights in some extra-legal system of
paternalism. Nor can it have respect for human rights imposed on it
and still remain true to its tradition [of colonialism] and commitment
[to an exclusively Jewish state]. There is simply no way this particular
form of political nationalism can accommodate the universal criteria
of human rights which, as I understand it, are the criteria of the United
Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration [of Human Rights] ....
Given the commitment of the State of Israel to the fundamental
concept of Zionism's "Jewish people" nationality, there is no way the
state can implement human rights in any of the commonly accepted
definitions of the term. The two concepts are unalterably inconsistent,
irreconcilable, and committed to inexorable conflict. 260

In so far as comparisons between Israeli Zionism and South
African Apartheid are concerned, other members of the Jewish
community have been just as vocal as Dr. Shahak and Rabbi Berger. For
instance, Maxim Ghilan, the well known Israeli journalist, has made the
following pronouncements on the racist nature of Zionism, the state of
Israel and its similarity with other racist regimes:
Israel has gradually become a more and more openly racist country.
Anyone not Jewish is at best a second class citizen .... [in] Israel no
real freedom has existed in matters of religion or race .... [It is a state]
officially defined as "Jewish" just as Rhodesia's or South Africa's are
"white" ....
Israeli society is basically a settlers' society. It does not primarily
concern itself with the "Indians" or "Niggers" of the land. Its first
priority is the creation of a united economic establishment for the
Jewish Israelis. Only then does it concern itself (almost as an
afterthought) with the captive Palestinians. 261

In a similar vein, Israeli professor Uri Davis has regularly denounced
the state of Israel as being a "racist" and "Apartheid state. " 262 In the
following passage, he offers a rather poignant and simple explanation of
the "organic link"-to paraphrase OAU resolution 77-shared between
Israeli Zionism and South African Apartheid:
The official and hegemonic ideological value system of the Republic
of South Africa is apartheid, and the key legal distinction in South
260
261

Berger, supra note 17 at 240, 248. 261 Zayid, supra note 82 at 60-61.
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African apartheid legislation is between "white" versus "coloured,"
"indian" and "black." [Likewise], the official hegemonic ideological
value system in the state of Israel is Zionism, and the key legal
distinction in Zionist legislation in Israel is between "Jew" versus
"non-Jew."263

Thus, it was not surprising to find that before its recent collapse, the
Apartheid regime of South Africa and the state of Israel looked toward
one another as a source of mutual support, ideas, trade, and
resources 264-a relationship that was denounced in 1973 by the UN
General Assembly as an "unholy alliance." 265
Notwithstanding the General Assembly's misguided revocation of
resolution 3379 (XXX), the foregoing discussion illustrates that there is
no shortage of other international documents, instruments, and
pronouncements that recognize Zionism as a form of racism and racial
discrimination. As this paper has shown, the same exclusivist,
chauvinist and colonialist characteristics of Zionism that gave rise to
resolution 3379 (XXX) twenty-three years ago continue to thrive in
Palestine/Israel today. When measured against the definition of "racial
discrimination" enshrined in the International Convention on the
Elimination ofAll Forms ofRacial Discrimination, there can be no other
conclusion than to recognize Zionism as a form of the same. This fact is
given all the more credence when one considers the sheer volume (the
totality of which was only broached in the foregoing analysis) of IsraeliJ ewish pronouncements condemning Zionism as a form of racism
comparable to that which plagued South Africa during the Apartheid
era.
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V.

CONCLUSION

The systematic violation of the human rights of the Palestinian people
by the state oflsrael has continued untrammeled for the past fifty years.
This paper has illustrated that the roots of this protracted assault are to
be found in Zionism-the colonial ideology that sought, and eventually
led to, the establishment of an exclusively Jewish state in Palestine.
Originally conceived as an emancipatory movement for persecuted
Jews of Europe, Zionism's "Jews-only" philosophy compelled it to
dispossess and expel Palestine's non-Jewish indigenous inhabitants in
1948, and then to conquer and illegally occupy what remained of their
country, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip, in 1967. These developments
were all inevitable consequences of the Zionist movement's three
central goals: the "conquest of the land,'' the "ingathering of the exiles,"
and the "transfer" of the indigenous (non-Jewish) Palestinians.
Over the fifty-year period that has elapsed since 1948, the state of
Israel has given expression to its racist world-view through the
promulgation of a multitude of Zionist laws that confer rights and
privileges on Jews, while simultaneously denying them to non-Jews.
Among other things, this legislation has made it possible for the Jewish
state to obfuscate with a false air of legality its discriminatory treatment
of the Palestinian people and the violation of their internationally
recognized human rights. These include, but are certainly not limited to:
the right to return, the right to nationality, the right to ownership and
protection of property, the right to work, the right to protection against
arbitrary arrest, detention and exile, the right to protection against
torture, cruel and inhuman punishment, the right to freedom of
expression and opinion, and the right to education.
The fact that Israel is a signatmy to eve1y major international
human rights instrument in which these rights are enshrined, has not in
the least deterred it in its program of denying the Palestinian people their
legitimate human rights. On the contrary, the more the Jewish state is
criticized for its persecution of the Palestinians, the more vigorous it
becomes in its effort to deflect blame for its actions onto someone, or
something else. Thus, in criticizing the UN Human Rights
Commission's regular and lengthy reports on Israel's treatment of
Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, former US representative to the
United Nations in Geneva, Morris Abram, made the following
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incredible pronouncement: "Israel is subjected to constant, unfailing,
one-sided condemnation [by the UN Commission on Human Rights] ...
. [This] consistent and one-sided condemnation . . . prevents any
improvement in the human rights of the people of the region and
contradicts the very purpose of the Commission and of the United
Nations under the Charter."266
Not surprisingly, this "shoot-the-messenger" excuse cannot
seriously be relied upon by the Jewish state, or its supporters, every time
it faces international ridicule for its abuses. As such, its leaders have
regularly turned to the nebulous catch-all defense known as "state
security." Bolstered by a fifty-year official state of emergency, Israel
has used "state security" as its principle justification-and cover-upfor its brutal treatment of Palestinians living under its rule. In their
sweeping capacity, the Defence (Emergency) Regulations (1945) have
enabled the Jewish state to promulgate unjust civil and military laws that
have been employed to violate Palestinian human rights with virtual
impunity since 1948. Although these regulations trace their origin to the
British Mandatory Government of Palestine (1922-48), Israeli
legislators have been unrelenting in their efforts to "revive" and
"amend" them as needed, for the all-important purpose of ensuring their
"security"-in other words, the continued exclusive sovereignty of the
Jewish people over what use to be Arab Palestine. Needless to say, the
Jewish state has never really acknowledged the security needs of the
very people it dispossessed, exiled, and disenfranchised.
Of course, the irony in all of this speaks volumes: The historically
persecuted Jews, victims of Czarist pogroms and Nazi genocide, have
been transformed into the willing persecutors of another people through
their own emancipatory ideology as embodied by the laws and policies
of the Jewish State of Israel. In his classic Statement on Race, Ashley
Montagu expounds upon this phenomenon as follows:
That the victims of racist practices are sometimes guilty of such
practices themselves, constitutes yet another sorry commentary on the
confusion into which some people are capable of falling .... The

266 M. Abram, "Appearance v. Reality: The Treatment of Israel in the UN Commission on
Human Rights and Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities" (Address to the 89th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International
Law, 6 April 1995).
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saying that every dog must have his underdog constitutes an ancient
recognition of a very human failing-the weak attempting to elevate
themselves by demeaning and demoting whatever "others" are
available for such purposes. 267

As the world prepares to enter the twenty-first century, and as the
Oslo Peace Process grudgingly trudges along, it is imperative for the
State of Israel to recognize and resist the "confusion" spoken of by
Montagu if real peace with the Palestinians is to be achieved. Despite
the fact that the Jewish state continues to subject the Palestinian people
to the hardship of its exclusivist and racist policies, the termination of
the Apartheid and "white" supremacist regime in South Africa ten years
ago is proof positive that such a recognition is within the realm of
possibility for the Zionist leaders of the State of Israel. The alternative
would be to maintain a status quo in which Israeli Jews possess human
rights and Palestinian Arabs do not; in which the freedom and prosperity
of the one depend on the domination and subjugation of the other.
Difficult as it may seem, the century-old conflict between Israelis
and Palestinians need not persist for another fifty years. Nevertheless, it
should be apparent that so long as Israeli state policy remains wedded to
Zionism's program of exclusivism and racism, it is highly unlikely that a
just peace will ever be achieved. In the words of Edward Said, "[t]here
can be no concept of human rights" in Palestine/Israel with a situation
that continues to accommodate "the strictures of Israeli state practice
against 'non-Jewish' Palestinians in favour of Jewish citizens."268
Indeed, if anything has been clear since the introduction of the UDHR in
1948, it is that the world can no longer afford to tolerate states founded
on outmoded ideologies of "the purity of the nation and the race"-the
human toll has proven itself far too great.
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